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INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND THE 
REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA: COMMERCIAL, 
COMPARATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONCERNS FROM A U.S. PERSPECTIVE 
S.I. STRONG* 
INTRODUCTION 
For decades, Latin American nations have worked to stabilize their 
economies and liberalize their trade regimes.1 By all accounts, these efforts 
have been highly successful, allowing Latin America to weather the recent 
economic downturn far better than any of the world’s developed 
economies.2  Indeed, as the United Nations recognized in March 2011: 
 
The region’s economic reforms of past decades, its fiscal and 
macroeconomic prudence and its sound financial supervision, . . . have 
allowed it . . . to enter the new decade with a promising outlook for 
growth . . . . For the first time in its history, the region achieved during 
the past decade a combination of high growth, macroeconomic stability, 
poverty reduction and improvement in income distribution. On the 
strength of the foregoing and of its privileged endowment in natural 
resources, energy, water and biodiversity, the Latin American . . . region 
will be called upon to assume an increasingly larger role in the global 
economy.3 
 
 *   Ph.D. (law), University of Cambridge (U.K.); D.Phil., University of Oxford (U.K.); J.D., 
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and Wales, is Associate Professor of Law at the University of Missouri and Senior Fellow at the Center 
for the Study of Dispute Resolution and has acted as Visiting Lecturer on international commercial 
arbitration and transnational litigation at the Universidad de Medellín in Colombia. This Article was 
drafted in part during a Visiting Fellowship at the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law at the 
University of Cambridge, and the author gratefully acknowledges the kind assistance of the staff and 
fellows during that time. Thanks are also due to Dimaro Alexis Agudelo and Fernando Mantilla-Serrano 
for their kind assistance and comments on an earlier draft of this Article. All errors of course remain the 
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 1.  See generally U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR LATIN AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN, THE UNITED 
STATES AND LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN - HIGHLIGHTS OF ECONOMY AND TRADE, U.N. Doc. 
LC/G.2489 (2011), available at http://www.eclac.org/cgi-bin/getProd.asp?xml=/publicaciones/xml/4/ 
42854/P42854.xml&xsl=/comercio/tpl/p9f.xsl&base=/tpl/top-bottom.xsl. 
 2.  See id. at 3. 
 3.  Id. 
STRONG MACRO  11-21-11 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2011  5:55 PM 
48 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 22:47 
 
Commercial potential of this magnitude has not gone unnoticed. 
Countries from all over the world are turning their eyes toward Latin 
America, and the United States is no exception. In fact, Latin America is 
currently the United States’ fastest-growing export market, with three times 
as many goods and services heading to this region as to China.4 
Although many Latin nations boast significant economic 
accomplishments, one country—the Republic of Colombia—is particularly 
impressive. For years, Colombia has been a model of political and 
economic stability in the Latin American region.5 Although the country’s 
commercial reputation has at times been overshadowed by other issues,6 
that did not stop the World Bank from ranking Colombia in 2011 as the 
best country in Latin America and the Caribbean for protecting investors 
and the third-best in the region for ease of doing business.7 
American investors and companies are already benefitting from the 
Colombian success story, engaging in enough cross-border business to 
make Colombia the United States’ twenty-sixth most active trading 
partner.8 The amount of commercial activity between Colombia and the 
United States is expected to rise by an additional $1.1 billion as a result of 
a free trade agreement9 that was recently ratified by the U.S. Congress.10 
 
 4.  Francisco Sánchez, Enhancing Trade in Latin America: Opening Opportunities, U.S. DEP’T 
OF COM.: THE COM. BLOG (June 13, 2011, 4:00 PM), http://www.commerce.gov/blog/2011/06/13/ 
enhancing-trade-latin-america-opening-opportunities. 
 5.  Fernando Mantilla-Serrano, Colombia, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA 
111, 111 (Nigel Blackaby et al. eds., 2002). 
 6.  Concerns have been raised about Colombia’s human rights record and drug-related violence. 
See Steve Rennie, Prime Minister Has High Hopes for Trade Deals on Latin American Swing, 
WINNIPEG FREE PRESS (Aug. 5, 2011, 5:07 PM), http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/business/ 
breakingnews/126846298.html. However, recent reports suggest that Colombia has made significant 
strides to improve its domestic situation. See Peter Wilkinson, Uribe: Why Colombia Is Winning War 
on Drugs, CNN INT’L (Aug. 15, 2011, 8:49 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/ 
americas/08/15/colombia.uribe.cocaine/index.html?hpt=hp_c2 (quoting former Colombian President 
Uribe as stating exports of cocaine have decreased from nearly 1,000 tons per year to 180 tons). 
 7.  Economy Rankings, WORLD BANK, available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings. 
 8.  See U.S. Trade Balance, by Partner Country 2010, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, available at 
http://dataweb.usitc.gov/scripts/cy_m3_run.asp (focusing on trade turnover). 
 9.  See Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Colom., available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/colombia-fta/final-text [hereinafter U.S.-Colombia Free Trade 
Agreement]; see also U.S. EMBASSY - BOGOTÁ, COLOMBIA ET AL., AN OVERVIEW OF ARBITRATION IN 
COLOMBIA FOR U.S. COMPANIES 8 (2011), available at http://export.gov/colombia/static/Report%20-
%20Arbitration%20in%20Colombia%20-%20final%206-1-11_Latest_eg_co_033097.pdf (providing 
that special protections for commercial agents will be eliminated within six months after the U.S.-
Colombia Free Trade Agreement is entered into force); see also Sánchez, supra note 4 (describing the 
free trade agreement with Colombia as part of an effort by the United States to increase economic 
integration throughout Latin America). 
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As impressive as Colombia may be in some regards, problems do 
exist. For example, one of the biggest concerns commercial actors have 
about cross-border transactions involves the ability to enforce contractual 
obligations in a timely and effective manner.11 Unfortunately, this is one 
area where Colombia does not rank highly at all.12 However, the difficulty 
in Colombia is not that the courts are corrupt. Instead, it is the length of 
time that it takes for a dispute to make its way through the judicial 
system.13 Although the situation is improving, in 2011 the World Bank 
reported that Colombia had the sixth slowest judicial system in the world, 
with the average contract dispute taking 1,346 days to resolve.14 
Corporate actors do not welcome the prospect of lengthy litigation. If 
the likely cost of remedying a contractual breach outweighs the potential 
profits to be made from the transaction, the transaction will not be 
completed. However, litigation is not the only means of resolving 
commercial disputes.15 Arbitration has long been seen as an appropriate 
alternative to judicial relief, particularly when national courts are unable to 
 
 10.  See Statement by U.S. Trade Representative Rod Kirk on Presidential Signature of Trade 
Legislation, Office of the United States Trade Representative, available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-
us/press-office/press-releases/2011/october/statement-us-trade-representative-ron-kirk-preside (noting 
President Obama signed legislation implementing the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement in October 
2011). 
 11.  For this reason, the World Bank includes a section on the enforcement of contracts in its 
annual rankings of the commercial potential of various countries. See WORLD BANK, supra note 7. 
 12.  See id. (ranking Colombia twenty-fifth out of thirty-two nations in Latin America). 
 13.  Colombia’s judicial system is slightly more complicated than that of the United States. The 
highest court for civil claims is the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), which hears 
appeals from a variety of lower circuit and municipal courts. See Gustavo Tamayo Arango & Bernardo 
Salazar Parra, Colombia, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO LITIGATION & 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 2010 51, 51 (2010).  In the arbitral context, the Supreme Court of Justice has 
exclusive jurisdiction to recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards. See Eduardo Zuleta, Republic of 
Colombia, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1, 3 (Jan Paulsson ed.) 
(Supp. 62 2010) [hereinafter Zuleta, 2010], available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com. The Council 
of State (Consejo de Estado) is the highest court for administrative law matters and has jurisdiction to 
hear actions to annul awards involving state parties. See id. (noting Superior Tribunals of the various 
judicial districts can annul awards rendered in their territory when state parties are not involved). The 
Constitutional Court (Corte Constitutional) reviews the constitutional validity of laws enacted by the 
legislative branch and decrees issued by the executive branch, including those involving arbitration. See 
id. 
 14.  See WORLD BANK & INT’L FIN. CORP., DOING BUSINESS 2011: MAKING A DIFFERENCE FOR 
ENTREPRENEURS 73-75 (2011), available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-
reports/doing-business-2011. 
 15.  Although some matters must be resolved in court as a matter of national law, the global trend 
is to allow an increasing number of disputes to be addressed through arbitration. See GARY B. BORN, 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 837-41 (2009) [hereinafter BORN (ICA)]; FOUCHARD, 
GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION paras. 330 to 598-1(Emmanuel 
Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999); JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION paras. 9-2 to 9-4 (2003). 
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provide principled, predictable or timely resolution of legal controversies.16 
Therefore, it is unsurprising that arbitration is being used in Colombia with 
increasing frequency to resolve both domestic and international disputes.17 
Indeed, Colombia has been ranked very highly in terms of the strength of 
its laws regarding commercial arbitration.18 
U.S. parties may see Colombian acceptance of arbitration as a positive 
indication of the country’s suitability for international trade, and that is true 
in many ways. However, arbitration is not a one-size-fits-all proposition, 
not even in the international realm, where multilateral agreements such as 
the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards (more commonly known as the New York 
Convention)19 and the Inter-American Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration of 1975 (more commonly known as the Panama 
Convention)20 have helped increase the predictability of cross-border 
commercial arbitration by harmonizing certain procedures relating to the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.21 Instead, international arbitration is 
still very much affected by the legal environment in individual states.22 A 
great deal of variation can arise even within a region (such as Latin 
America) that is customarily considered relatively homogenous in its 
 
 16.  See BORN (ICA), supra note 15, at 85-86; LEW ET AL., supra note 15, paras. 1-18 to 1-29. 
 17.  See U.S. EMBASSY, supra note 9, at 3; see also Arango & Parra, supra note 13, at 56 
(describing the increasing use of arbitration in Colombia to resolve contract disputes). 
 18.  See generally The Inaugural Survey of Latin American Arbitral Institutions, INST. FOR 
TRANSNAT’L ARB. 7 (2011), http://www.cailaw.org/ita/itasurvey.pdf (noting that the country does not 
perform as well in terms of ease of process or extent of judicial assistance). 
 19.  Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 
21 U.S.T. 2518 [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
 20.  Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1975, Pub. L. No. 
101-369, 104 Stat. 448 (1990) [hereinafter Panama Convention]. 
 21.  See BORN (ICA), supra note 15, at 95-97; see generally Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 
U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974). 
 22.  See BORN (ICA), supra note 15, at 99-100.  Although the international legal community has 
attempted to minimize differences in national laws on arbitration through promulgation of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration (Model Arbitration Law), many states, including both the United States and 
Colombia, have retained their own unique legislation on arbitration. See generally U.N. Comm. on Int’l 
Trade Law, Rep. on its 18th Sess., June 3-21, 1985, Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/40/17; GAOR, 40th Sess., 
Supp. No. 17(June 21, 1985), revised by Revised Articles of the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration, UNCITRAL, 39th Sess., June 17-July7, 2006 Annex I, U.N. 
Doc. A/61/17; GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 17(July 7, 2006) [hereinafter Model Arbitration Law]; see 
also Status of UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/ 
arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html (noting that sixty-five countries and seven U.S. states 
have adopted the original or revised Model Arbitration Law in whole or in part). 
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approach to legal issues.23 Furthermore, there is never any guarantee that 
laws are as effective in practice as they are on paper.24 
Multinational actors therefore cannot simply assume that states that 
espouse a pro-arbitration policy will necessarily enact laws that resemble 
those used elsewhere, including the actor’s home legal system.25 Instead, 
parties contemplating a cross-border commercial relationship must conduct 
extensive research into their counterpart’s home legal system and consider 
a wide variety of issues prior to entering into an arbitration agreement.26 
For example, information must be obtained regarding the types of disputes 
that may be considered arbitrable in a particular state; the kind of 
procedures that may be used during the arbitration; whether and to what 
extent national courts involve themselves in the arbitral proceedings while 
the arbitration is pending; and the procedures and standards to be used to 
vacate or enforce an award arising out of an international arbitration. 
The problem for many U.S. parties is that very little is known in the 
United States about arbitration in Colombia or involving Colombian 
parties.27 This is not to say that no information is available on Colombian 
arbitration law. However, much of the material is extremely short, 
providing little more than intermittent highlights of recent developments 
without giving sufficient context for those who are unfamiliar with the 
legal system as a whole.28 Only a few in-depth analyses of Colombian 
 
 23.  See U.S. EMBASSY, supra note 9, at 3. 
 24.  See id. at 8. 
 25.  See id. 
 26.  See generally GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION 
AGREEMENTS: PLANNING, DRAFTING AND ENFORCING (2010) (describing the issues which should be 
considered while planning, drafting and enforcing international dispute resolution agreements) 
[hereinafter BORN (Drafting and Enforcing)]. 
 27.  Much of the information on Colombian law that does make its way to the U.S. arbitral 
community does so in an abbreviated or a contextual fashion, thus creating confusion about the efficacy 
of the Colombian arbitral regime. See infra note 371 (regarding the somewhat infamous TermoRio 
case).  Furthermore, changes in the law that would cure certain unfortunate precedents often go 
unreported. See id. (regarding reforms that eliminated the possibility that TermoRio will be repeated in 
the future). 
 28.  See BRIGARD & URRUTIA ABOGADOS, GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS IN COLOMBIA 17-19 
(2006) (including two pages on dispute resolution); Scott Appleton, Latin American Arbitration: The 
Story Behind the Headlines, 64 INT’L B. NEWS 27, 27-29 (Apr. 2010) (including two pages on 
Colombia); Arango & Parra, supra note 13, at 51 (including one chapter on Colombia); Hunter Carter, 
Foreign Arbitration in Colombia and Enforcement Issues, COLOM. L. & BUS. POST (Apr. 24, 2009), 
available at http://colombialawbiz.com/2009/04/24/foreign-arbitration-in-colombia-and-enforcement-
issues/ (constituting an informal blog on recent developments); Hunter Carter, Improving Recognition 
and Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards - Analysis and Translation of Proposed Arbitration 
Law, COLOM. L. & BUS. POST (June 5, 2011), available at http://colombialawbiz.com/2011/06/05/ 
improving-recognition-and-enforcement-of-international-arbitral-awards-analysis-and-translation-of-
proposed-arbitration-law/ (constituting an informal blog on recent developments) [hereinafter Carter, 
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arbitration law exist in English,29 compared to more extensive commentary 
focusing on other Latin American jurisdictions, such as Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico and Peru.30 Many of the scholarly articles on Latin 
American arbitration law that do mention Colombia typically do so only in 
passing.31 
This Article fills that gap in the literature by describing the Colombian 
approach to international commercial arbitration in detail. The discussion 
not only includes references to both statutory and case law, it also includes 
comparisons to U.S. law so as to help U.S. parties put the analysis into 
context. Although the focus of this Article is on international disputes, 
 
Improving Recognition]; Mauricio Gomm-Santos, What’s New in Latin American ADR?, 65 DISP. RES. 
J. 13 (May-Oct. 2010) (including a one-page update on recent developments); Nicolas Gamboa 
Morales, Colombia’s Adoption of the Model Law: Almost There?,15. No. 1 IBA ARB. NEWS 167 (Mar. 
2010) (including a short analysis of whether Colombia should adopt the Model Arbitration Law); 
Carolita L. Oliveros, International Distribution Issues: Contract Materials, WL SH064 ALI-ABA 675 
(Mar. 20-22, 2003) (constituting a short practitioner analysis of arbitration law with a passing reference 
to Colombia); Alejandro Ponieman, How Important is ADR to Latin America?, 58 DISP. RES. J. 65, 65 
(Feb.-Apr. 2003) (including one page which mentions Colombia); Jorge Posada-Villaveces, Arbitration 
Versus Litigation in Colombia, INT’L L. PRAC. 12 (Spring 2002) (constituting a short practitioner 
analysis); Daniel Posse Velasquez & Carolina Posada, Colombia, in Latin Lawyer Reference 2008, 
available at http://www.phrlegal.com (constituting a short practitioner analysis); Mairee Uran-
Bidegain, Colombian Constitutional Court Rulings on the Applicability of International Arbitration to 
State Contracts, LATIN AM. LAW (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.latinarbitrationlaw.com/ 
colombian-constitutional-court-rulings-on-the-applicability-of-international-arbitration-to-state-
contracts/ (reflecting a short update on recent developments); Erika P. Schultz, Latin American 
Commercial Arbitration: The Colombian Approach, 9 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 295 (1998) 
(constituting a short practitioner analysis); Eduardo Zuleta, Colombia, in LATIN LAWYER REFERENCE, 
available at http://www.latinlawyer.com/reference/topics/45/jurisdictions/8/colombia (reflecting a short 
practical analysis) [hereinafter Zuleta, Colombia]. 
 29.  See CAVELIER ABOGADOS, DOING BUSINESS IN COLOMBIA ch. 27 (forthcoming 2011) 
(focusing on alternative dispute resolution); see generally Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5; Zuleta, 2010, 
supra note 13. 
 30.  See, e.g., ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE IN LATIN AMERICA (Alejandro M. Garro ed., 
2001) (focusing on all of Latin America); JAN KLEINHEISTERKAMP, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA 469-607 (2005) (focusing on Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Paraguay and Uruguay); CHRISTIAN LEATHLEY, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN LATIN 
AMERICA: AN INSTITUTIONAL OVERVIEW (2007); Jonathan C. Hamilton, Three Decades of Latin 
American Commercial Arbitration, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1099, 1112-17 (2009); Paul E. Mason & Roque 
J. Caivano, International Commercial Arbitration Practice in Latin America, in INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION PRACTICE: 21ST CENTURY PERSPECTIVES 8-1 (Horacio A. Grigera Naón & 
Paul E. Mason eds., 2010). 
 31.  See Alexia Brunet & Juan Agustin Lentini, Arbitration of Oil, Gas, and Energy Disputes in 
Latin America, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 591, 616-17 (2007); Adam B. Leichtling & Laura M. 
Paredes, Fundamental Concepts in Reinsurance in Latin American Countries, 37 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. 
L. REV. 1, 42-45 (2005); John F. Molloy, Symposium - Products Liability in Latin America: Part II: 
Conference Report, 8 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 47, 73, 76 (2003); Eduardo Palmer & Eliana Lopez, 
The Use of Multi-Tiered Dispute Resolution Clauses in Latin America: Questions of Enforceability, 14 
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 285, 293 (2003). 
STRONG MACRO  11-21-11 FINAL(DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2011  5:55 PM 
2011] INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND THE REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA 53 
some attention is nevertheless paid to the law governing domestic 
arbitration in Colombia, since certain domestic provisions of law apply to 
international arbitration with equal weight.32 The goal is to provide U.S. 
parties with the information they need to (1) evaluate the risks and benefits 
associated with entering into an arbitration agreement with a Colombian 
party and (2) establish the kinds of procedures needed to provide optimal 
protection of the arbitral process and any resulting award, regardless of 
whether the arbitration is seated in Colombia or elsewhere. 
The discussion proceeds as follows. Section I considers the various 
international laws that affect international commercial arbitration in 
Colombia and with Colombian parties. This analysis is somewhat different 
from others of this type because of the predominant role played by the 
Panama Convention in disputes involving U.S. and Colombian parties.33 
Very little has been written about the Panama Convention compared to the 
New York Convention, and although the two treaties are similar in many 
ways, certain significant differences exist.34 
Section II focuses on Colombian law, particularly Law No. 315/9635 
and Decree 1818/98,36 which are the two primary statutes on arbitration.37 
Colombian case law will also be discussed in this section, although judicial 
opinions play something of a different role in civil law jurisdictions than in 
common law countries and are often written in a manner that common law-
trained lawyers find difficult.38 Among the issues considered in this section 
 
 32.  See infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.  Some aspects of domestic arbitration law and 
practice must nevertheless be omitted for reasons of space, although further reading is available.  See 
e.g., Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 1-69. 
 33.  See Panama Convention, supra note 20; see infra notes 46-78 and accompanying text. 
 34.  See New York Convention, supra note 19; Panama Convention, supra note 20; see infra notes 
48-80 and accompanying text. 
 35.  See L. 315/96, septiembre 12, 1996, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.), available in Spanish at 
Juriscol, http://juriscol.banrep.gov.co (search for 315 under “Leyes”) [hereinafter Law No. 315/96].  An 
unofficial English translation may be found in Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, as well as in 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 5, Annex 4D - Colombia, at 509-10. 
 36.  See D. 1818/98, septiembre 7, 1998, D.O. (Colom.), available in Spanish at Juriscol, 
http://juriscol.banrep.gov.co (search for 1818 under “Decretos”) [hereinafter Decree 1818/98]. An 
unofficial English translation of Articles 115 to 198 may be found in Republic of Colombia, in 
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1, 1-20 (Jan Paulsson ed.) (Supp. 54 
2009), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com. 
 37.  However, these two provisions do not constitute the entirety of Colombian law on arbitration, 
and references to other statutory provisions are also made throughout this Article. See infra notes 82-92 
and accompanying text (noting the intricacy of Colombia’s arbitration law).  Although Law No. 315/96 
may appear on its face to be the exclusive statutory reference to international commercial arbitration, 
Decree 1818/98 also plays a role in international proceedings.  See infra notes 92-99 and accompanying 
text. 
 38.  As a general rule, opinions written by civil law judges are much shorter and more conclusory 
than those written by common law judges, providing very few of the underlying facts and very little in 
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is a somewhat unique procedure known as the acción de tutela, which 
allows a constitutional challenge to be mounted to an arbitral award or 
proceeding.39 Comparisons to U.S. law are made throughout this section, 
providing a framework for analyzing the Colombian arbitral regime. 
The final section looks to the future of arbitration law in Colombia by 
discussing recent and pending efforts to reform the Colombian statutory 
scheme. This section also concludes the Article by drawing together the 
various strands of discussion and providing some final observations. 
The analysis begins with an introduction of the international legal 
environment in which Colombia operates. That discussion is found in the 
next section. 
I.  INTERNATIONAL LAW AFFECTING COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION IN COLOMBIA AND WITH COLOMBIAN PARTIES 
Colombia has signed several international treaties involving 
arbitration, including the New York Convention,40 the Panama 
Convention,41 the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
 
the way of judicial reasoning. This, of course, leaves courts and parties with little guidance on how 
similar disputes will be decided in the future, for although later courts will know the outcome of an 
earlier dispute, they may not necessarily be able to glean the reasoning behind the decision. However, 
this is not inherently problematic for civil law lawyers or judges because of (1) the predominance given 
to statutory law in the civil law tradition and (2) the emphasis placed by civil law jurisprudence on 
general, relatively abstract principles of law rather than case-by-case analysis in response to individual 
disputes. Nevertheless, civil law judges do strive to achieve results that are consistent with existing 
precedents, often through the assistance of treatises written by learned scholars, which provide 
extensive and highly persuasive analysis regarding legal reasoning on certain issues. See S.I. STRONG, 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A GUIDE FOR U.S. FEDERAL JUDGES (forthcoming 2012) 
[hereinafter STRONG, GUIDE]; KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE 
LAW 256-75 (Tony Weir trans., Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed. 1998) (1977); Jacques H. Herbots, 
Interpretation of Contracts, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 325, 325-47 (Jan M. 
Smits ed., 2006).  A good English-language example of a civil law judicial opinion is Empresa 
Colombiana de Vías Férreas (Ferrovías) v. Drummond Ltd., Consejo de Estado [C.E.] [Administrative 
Court], Sala de lo Contencioso Administrativo, Seccion Tercera, octubre 24, 2003, No. 25.25, aff’d 
C.E., abril 22, 2004, No. 24.261, in 29 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 643 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2004).  A 
collection of important judicial decisions concerning arbitration is available in Spanish on the website 
of the Centro de Arbitraje y Conciliación de la Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá. See Jurisprudencia, 
CENTRO DE ARBITRAJE Y CONCILIACIÓN DE LA CÁMARA DE COMERCIO DE BOGOTÁ, 
http://www.cacccb.org.co/contenido/contenido.aspx?catID=3&conID=62 (last visited Oct. 1, 2011). 
 39.  See Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 37; see also Colombia, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE 
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD art. 86 (2005) (setting forth constitutional basis for an acción de tutela) 
[hereinafter Colombia Constitution]. 
 40.  See New York Convention, supra note 19.  Colombia’s initial adherence to the New York 
Convention was declared unconstitutional in 1988, but the country re-ratified the treaty in 1990.  See 
INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, GUIDE TO NATIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR RECOGNITION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF NEW YORK CONVENTION AWARDS 88 (2009). 
 41.  See Panama Convention, supra note 20. 
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Between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention),42 and 
the Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign 
Judgments and Arbitral Awards, more commonly known as the 
Montevideo Convention, which facilitates the enforcement of arbitration 
with several of the members of the Organization of American States.43 
Although the United States has not adhered to the Montevideo 
Convention,44 it has signed and ratified the other three treaties.45 The two 
countries have also concluded a free trade agreement that would provide 
for arbitration of disputes, although those provisions do not relate to the 
type of private commercial (as opposed to investment) disputes at issue in 
this Article.46 Since treaty-based investment arbitration differs from 
international commercial arbitration in several significant ways, this Article 
will not discuss arbitration under either the ICSID Convention or the U.S.-
Colombia free trade agreement.47 The analysis will instead focus on the 
New York and Panama Conventions, the two commercial treaties that have 
been ratified by both the United States and Colombia.48 
The New York and Panama Conventions constitute significant 
advancements in international commercial arbitration, greatly facilitating 
the cross-border enforcement of arbitral awards and arbitration 
 
 42.  See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. 
 43.  See Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity 
of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards, May 14, 1979, O.A.S.T.S. No. 51, 1439 U.N.T.S. 87 
[hereinafter Montevideo Convention]; see also Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 3 (regarding 
Colombia’s adherence to various conventions). 
 44.  See Montevideo Convention, supra note 43. 
 45.  See ICSID Convention, supra note 42; 9 U.S.C. §§ 201, 301 (2006). 
 46.  See U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement, supra note 9; see also supra note 9 and 
accompanying text.  For more information on dispute resolution provisions in ICSID and free trade 
agreements, see generally Henri C. Alvarez, Arbitration Under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA 313 (Nigel Blackaby et al. eds., 
2002); David A. Gantz, Settlement of Disputes Under the Central America-Dominican Republic-United 
States Free Trade Agreement, 30 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 331 (2007) (discussing CAFTA-DR and 
NAFTA dispute resolution); Katia Fach Gómez, Latin America and ICSID: David Versus Goliath?, 17 
L. & BUS. REV. AM. 195 (2011); see also U.S. EMBASSY, supra note 9, at 4 (discussing Colombia’s 
adherence to various free trade agreements (FTAs) and bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and the 
effect Colombian arbitration law has on investment arbitration); Nigel Blackaby, Arbitration Under 
Bilateral Investment Treaties in Latin America, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA 
379 (Nigel Blackaby et al. eds., 2002); Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 71-73 (listing FTAs and BITs 
involving Colombia). 
 47.  See ICSID Convention, supra note 42; U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement, supra note 9; 
LEW ET AL., supra note 15, paras. 28-8 to 28-13. 
 48.  See New York Convention, supra note 19; Panama Convention, supra note 20. 
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agreements.49 The New York Convention is the more well-known of the 
two treaties and, with 146 state parties, the more broadly applicable.50 This 
treaty has been credited with revolutionizing global commerce by 
facilitating the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and thereby creating 
a neutral, reputable and effective means of resolving cross-border legal 
disputes.51 
The New York Convention predates the Panama Convention by nearly 
twenty years and in many ways acted as a model for the later agreement.52 
The drafters intended the two treaties to be interpreted and applied 
harmoniously,53 and when the United States adopted the Panama 
Convention, Congress expressly stated that it expected that U.S. courts 
would achieve uniform results under the two instruments.54 
Because the two treaties are perceived as being so similar and because 
the New York Convention includes a geographically wider field of 
application than the Panama Convention, most scholarly and judicial 
commentary in the United States tends to focus on the New York 
Convention.55 However, the U.S. Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) includes a 
rule of priority addressing situations where both treaties could apply, 
stating that it is the Panama Convention, rather than the New York 
Convention, that governs if a majority of the parties to the arbitration 
agreement are from countries that have ratified or acceded to the Panama 
Convention and are also members of the Organization of American 
States.56 Commentators have indicated that a similar rule of priority should 
 
 49.  See New York Convention, supra note 19; Panama Convention, supra note 20; BORN 
(Drafting and Enforcing), supra note 26, at 123-130. 
 50.  See Status-1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration 
Awards, U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/ 
arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2011) (listing 146 state parties). 
 51.  See BORN (Drafting and Enforcing), supra note 26, at 123-24. 
 52.  See New York Convention, supra note 19; Panama Convention, supra note 20; John P. 
Bowman, The Panama Convention and Its Implementation Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 11 AM. 
REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 19-20 (2000). 
 53.  See BORN (Drafting and Enforcing), supra note 26, at 124-25; Bowman, supra note 52, at 19-
20. 
 54.  See H. R. REP. NO. 101-501, at 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 675, 678, 1990 WL 
132745; DRC, Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, 774 F.Supp.2d 66, 71 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 55.  See, e.g., Employers Ins. of Wasau v. Banco Seguros Del Estado, 34 F.Supp.2d 1115, 1120 
(E.D. Wis. 1999) (“There is little case law interpreting the Inter-American Convention.”), aff’d, 199 
F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 1999); Bowman, supra note 52, at 1-2; Helena Tavares Erickson et al., Looking 
Back, and Ahead: The Panama Convention after 30 Years, 23 ALT. HIGH COST LITIG. 184, 184 (2004). 
 56.  See New York Convention, supra note 19; Panama Convention, supra note 20; 9 U.S.C. § 
305 (2006). 
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apply in other jurisdictions.57 Nevertheless, suggestions have been made 
that “it would be a mistake to conclude that [the Panama] Convention 
operates with equal effectiveness in the United States and Latin 
America.”58 Therefore, U.S. parties should remain cautious when 
considering how international laws on arbitration are interpreted and 
applied in Colombia, although the presumption should be that the Panama 
Convention controls in bilateral disputes involving a U.S. and Colombian 
party.59 
In some ways, it may seem that debates about applicability of the 
Panama Convention versus the New York Convention are irrelevant, since 
the two conventions are similar in many important regards.60 For example, 
the two conventions reflect virtually identical language with respect to the 
standards associated with the enforcement of arbitral awards.61 
However, the two conventions reflect some key differences.62 The 
most important for purposes of this discussion involves Article 3 of the 
Panama Convention, which imposes a specific set of procedural rules in 
 
 57.  See KLEINHEISTERKAMP, supra note 30, at 27 (“If the arbitration is a genuine Inter-American 
one, the Panama-Convention will prevail as lex specialis over the [New York]-Convention”); Bowman, 
supra note 52, at 45-47; Hamilton, supra note 30, at 1109.  However, it is not clear whether Colombia 
would adopt the same rule of priority.  For example, one case that appeared to be a likely candidate for 
the application of the Panama Convention considered the dispute under the New York Convention 
instead.  See Sunward Overseas, S.A. v. Servicios Marítimos Ltd., 20 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 651 (Corte 
Suprema de Justicia 1992).  That case involved a Colombian party and a party whose nationality was 
unstated, although public records suggest that the unknown party was registered in the Republic of 
Panama, a signatory of the Panama Convention. See Panama Convention, supra note 20; Public 
Register, REP. OF PAN., https://www.registro-publico.gob.pa/scripts/nwwisapi.dll/conweb/ 
MESAMENU?TODO=SHOW&ID=143868 (relating to Sunward Overseas, S.A.).  Some discrepancies 
in the application of the two treaties may arise because the New York Convention looks to the place of 
the arbitration when deciding issues of applicability, whereas the Panama Convention arguably looks to 
the nationality of the parties. See New York Convention, supra note 19, art. I(1); Panama Convention, 
supra note 20, art. 1; Bowman, supra note 52, at 45-47 (stating this is an issue of some debate). 
 58.  See Bowman, supra note 52, at 19. 
 59.  See 9 U.S.C. § 305; Banco de Seguros del Estado v. Mutual Marine Offices, Inc., 230 F. 
Supp. 2d 362, 367 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d 344 F.3d 255 (2d Cir. 2003); Progressive Casualty Ins. v. 
C.A. Reaseguradora Nacional de Venezuela, 802 F. Supp. 1069, 1074 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev’d on other 
grounds, 991 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1993).  But see supra note 57. 
 60.  See New York Convention, supra note 19; Panama Convention, supra note 20; BORN 
(Drafting and Enforcing), supra note 26, at 125. 
 61.  See New York Convention, supra note 19, art. V; Panama Convention, supra note 20, art. 5; 
BORN (Drafting and Enforcing), supra note 26, at 125. 
 62.  See BORN (Drafting and Enforcing), supra note 26, at 125; Bowman, supra note 52, at 20-
115.  For example, the Panama Convention does not include language requiring national courts to refer 
disputes to arbitration in cases where a valid arbitration agreement exists.  See BORN (Drafting and 
Enforcing), supra note 26, at 125.  A comprehensive comparison of the Panama and New York 
Conventions is beyond the scope of this Article.  However, further reading is available.  See Bowman, 
supra note 52, passim; Erickson et al., supra note 55, passim. 
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cases where the parties have failed to agree on the procedures to be used in 
the arbitration.63 This provision is very important, since it bars the 
application of certain default rules in Colombian arbitration law.64 
Article 3 states that “the arbitration shall be conducted in accordance 
with the rules of procedure of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration 
Commission” (IACAC Arbitration Rules) in any case where the parties 
have not made an express agreement regarding the governing procedural 
rules.65 Because the Panama Convention applies in any bilateral arbitration 
between a U.S. and Colombian party, the IACAC Arbitration Rules will 
necessarily apply in bilateral arbitrations between U.S. and Colombian 
nationals where the parties have not agreed otherwise.66 
However, Colombian arbitration is very often multiparty in nature, 
with forty percent  of the cases handled by the Centro de Arbitraje y 
Conciliación de la Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá (Arbitration and 
Conciliation Center of the Botogá Chamber of Commerce), the leading 
arbitration institution in Colombia, involving more than two parties.67 
Many of these disputes may be entirely domestic, since Colombian law 
contains an unusually liberal provision requiring the joinder of any third 
parties, even non-signatories, who could be directly affected by an 
arbitration award.68 Although this rule will not apply in international 
arbitrations,69 multiparty disputes nevertheless can and do apply in the 
context of international arbitration.70 Therefore, the question is whether the 
 
 63.  See Panama Convention, supra note 20, art. 3; Bowman, supra note 52, at 24-35; Erickson et 
al., supra note 55, at 185; Hamilton, supra note 30, at 1117. 
 64.  See infra notes 217-18 and accompanying text. Article 2 of the Panama Convention is also 
useful in this regard, in that it lays down certain rules regarding the appointment of arbitrators. See 
Panama Convention, supra note 20, art. 2. 
 65.  See Panama Convention, supra note 20, art. 3; Inter-American Commercial Arbitration 
Commission Rules of Procedure, 22 C.F.R. pt. 194 app. A (1975) (amended April 1, 2002) [hereinafter 
IACAC Arbitration Rules]. 
 66.  See Panama Convention, supra note 20; 9 U.S.C. § 301 (2006). 
 67.  See INST. FOR TRANSNAT’L ARB., supra note 18, at 14. 
 68.  See Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 125 (noting that the circumstances are limited to 
situations where the award would have res judicata effect over the third party); see also Zuleta, 2010, 
supra note 13, at 11-12 (noting arbitral consolidation in domestic arbitration follows the same rules as 
judicial consolidation under Article 157 of the Code of Civil Procedure).  This may explain why there 
appear to be no reported cases involving non-signatories in the international context.  See Zuleta, 
Colombia, supra note 28, para. 12; see also U.S. EMBASSY, supra note 9, at 21 (claiming that 
“Colombia is restrictive in extending the scope of the arbitration agreement to non-signatory parties”). 
 69.  See Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 12. 
 70.  See LEW ET AL., supra note 15, para. 16-1 (noting that the percentage of multiparty 
arbitrations administered by the ICC rose from 20% to 30% during the period 1995 to 2001); Martin 
Platte, When Should an Arbitrator Join Cases?, 18 ARB. INT’L 67, 67 (2002) (noting that more than 
fifty percent of LCIA arbitrations reportedly involve more than two parties).  Most multilateral disputes 
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Panama Convention, and thus the IACAC Arbitration Rules, will also 
apply in multiparty arbitrations.71 
On one level, few problems arise, since both the Panama and New 
York Conventions apply to bilateral and multilateral arbitrations with equal 
force.72 Furthermore, it is clear that the IACAC Arbitration Rules could and 
should apply in any multiparty dispute where all of the participants come 
from states that have signed Panama Convention.73 Currently fifteen 
countries have ratified the Panama Convention in addition to the United 
States and Colombia, with two more having signed the Convention but not 
yet ratified it.74 
However, it is not clear whether the IACAC Arbitration Rules would 
or could apply by default to any multiparty arbitration involving a party 
who was not resident in a nation that had signed the Panama Convention.75 
Although a court or arbitral tribunal might be inclined to construct a theory 
of implicit consent so as to impose the IACAC Arbitration Rules on a party 
from a non-signatory state without that party’s explicit consent, this Article 
 
involve three to five parties.  See S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration ‘Change the Nature’ of 
Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T and a Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012).  However, both the United States and Colombia appear amenable to the concept of 
class arbitration. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Stolt-
Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010); Eduardo Zuleta Jaramillo, Valencia v. 
Bancolombia, Arbitral Tribunal from the Bogotá Chamber of Commerce, KLUWERARBITRATION (Apr. 
24, 2003), http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (noting the arbitrator was to consider whether the plaintiff 
met the standards necessary for a class action, although “the question of whether arbitral agreements 
can serve as an instrument for filing class actions or other constitutional actions remains unanswered 
within the Colombian legal system”); see Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 14; see also S.I. 
Strong, The Sounds of Silence: Are U.S. Arbitrators Creating Internationally Enforceable Awards When 
Ordering Class Arbitration in Cases of Contractual Silence or Ambiguity?, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1017, 
1031-32 (2009). 
 71.  See IACAC Arbitration Rules, supra note 65.  While the IACAC Arbitration Rules do not 
mention multiparty arbitration, that is not a bar to the use of those Rules in such proceedings, since 
multiparty arbitrations have proceeded in the past under rules that were similarly silent.  See LEW ET 
AL., supra note 15, paras. 16-30 to 16-32. 
 72.  See generally New York Convention, supra note 19; Panama Convention, supra note 20; 
BORN (ICA), supra note 15, at 2073-76. 
 73.  See Panama Convention, supra note 20; Bowman, supra note 52, at 45-47. 
 74.  The seventeen states that have ratified the Panama Convention include Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, the United States, Uruguay and Venezuela.  See Panama Convention, supra note 20; 
see also Organization of American States, Foreign Trade Information System, available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/comarb/iacac/iacac2e.asp [hereinafter SICE].  The two countries that 
have signed the Convention but not yet ratified it are the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua.  See 
SICE, supra. 
 75.  See Panama Convention, supra note 20; Bowman, supra note 52, at 45-47. This issue could 
arise in cases involving both conventional multiparty arbitration and class arbitration. 
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will not engage in speculation on this point.76 Instead, this discussion takes 
the view that most commercial parties would agree to the adoption of the 
IACAC Arbitration Rules so as to avoid the uncertainty that would 
otherwise ensue.77 This approach is permitted under the IACAC Arbitration 
Rules, which can be explicitly adopted by parties either before or after the 
dispute has arisen.78 If the parties do not agree to application of the IACAC 
Arbitration Rules, then procedural issues would be governed by the law of 
the arbitral seat.79 However, the analysis in this Article proceeds as if the 
IACAC Arbitration Rules apply to international disputes in the absence of 
party agreement, since bilateral arbitrations will likely be the norm.80 
Having set forth the international law affecting arbitration between a 
U.S. and Colombian party, it is now time to consider Colombia’s national 
laws on arbitration. The following discussion considers both statutory 
provisions and judicial opinions, and compares the Colombian approach to 
the U.S. approach.81 
II. COLOMBIAN ARBITRATION LAW 
A. Introduction 
Like many countries, Colombia differentiates between its treatment of 
international and domestic arbitration. International arbitration is primarily 
addressed in Law No. 315/96,82 while domestic arbitration is primarily 
 
 76.  See Panama Convention, supra note 20; IACAC Arbitration Rules, supra note 65; Bowman, 
supra note 52, at 45-47. 
 77.  See generally Banco de Seguros del Estado v. Mut. Marine Offices, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d 362, 
367 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (applying the Panama Convention when there was no information on the 
nationalities of the parties but parties agreed that the Convention would govern), aff’d, 344 F.3d 255 (2d 
Cir. 2003). 
 78.  See IACAC Arbitration Rules, supra note 65, art. 1(1); see also infra note 232 and 
accompanying text (noting validity of both pre- and post-dispute agreements in Colombian and U.S. 
arbitration law). 
 79.  See IACAC Arbitration Rules, supra note 65; LEW ET AL., supra note 15, paras. 21-2 to 21-
18. 
 80.  See IACAC Arbitration Rules, supra note 65. 
 81.  This Article will focus on arbitrations arising under the FAA, although it is possible for an 
international arbitration to proceed under state law as well. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2006); BORN (ICA), 
supra note 15, at 140-44.  Issues of preemption are beyond the scope of this Article, as are detailed 
examinations of the content and applicability of statutes regarding international commercial arbitration 
enacted by individual U.S. states. See id. at 143. 
 82.  See Law No. 315/96, supra note 35.  This law replaced two earlier edicts.  See D. 2279/89, 
octubre 7, 1989, D.O. (Colom.), available at http://juriscol.banrep.gov.co (search for 2279 under 
“Decretos”) [hereinafter Decree 2279/89]; L. 23/91, marzo 21, 1991, D.O. (Colom.), available at 
http://juriscol.banrep.gov.co (search for 23 under “Leyes”) [hereinafter Law No. 23/91].  This law also 
abrogated and replaced Articles 663-77 and 693-95 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Articles 2011-
25 of the Commercial Code.  See Código de Comercio, Título III del Arbitramento, arts. 2011-25 
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covered by Decree 1818/98.83 Decree 1818/98 is an omnibus provision 
encompassing most aspects of the law regarding arbitration and 
conciliation in Colombia and includes the substantive provisions of Decree 
2279/89, which had previously been the most comprehensive enactment on 
domestic arbitration in Colombia.84 However, Decree 1818/98 contained a 
number of errors when it was enacted, omitting some provisions that are 
currently in force and including some new items that are unique to this 
statute.85 
A variety of other statutes also address arbitration, meaning that 
researchers must do more than simply consider Law No. 315/96 and 
Decree 1818/98 in isolation.86 Perhaps the most important of these other 
provisions is Law No. 80/93, which was amended by Law No. 1150/07 and 
 
(Colom.) (repealed 1989), available at http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/codigo/ 
codigo_comercio.html#1 (select article number in drop-down box marked “Artículo”) [hereinafter 
Commercial Code]; Código de Procedimiento Civil, arts. 663-77, 693-96 (Colom.) (Articles 663-77 
repealed 1989, Articles 693-95 concerning exequatur), available at http://www. secretariasenado. 
gov.co/senado/basedoc/codigo/ codigo_procedimiento_civil.html#1 (select article number in drop-down 
box marked “Articulo”) [hereinafter Code of Civil Procedure].  Decree 2279/89 can be found in English 
in Republic of Colombia, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1, 1-10 (Jan 
Paulsson ed.) (Supp. 18 1994), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com.  Articles 693-94 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure can be found in English at Sunward Overseas S.A. v. Servicios Marítimos Ltd., 
20 Nov. 1992, XX Y.B. COMM. ARB. 651 (1992). 
 83.  See Decree 1818/98, supra note 36. 
 84.  See id.; Decree 2279/89, supra note 82; Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 113.  Decree 
1818/98 also combined Law No. 315/96 with the ICSID Convention, giving the impression that the two 
instruments were part of the same statute.  See ICSID Convention, supra note 42; Decree 1818/98, 
supra note 36, arts. 196-98; Law No. 315/96, supra note 35; Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 2. 
 85.  See Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 1-2. 
 86.  See Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 1-2; see also Arango & Parra, supra note 13, at 56 (noting 
primary laws relating to dispute resolution).  For example, Decree 2651/91 discusses certain aspects of 
domestic arbitration, as does Law No. 446/98. See D. 2651/91, noviembre 25, 1991, D.O. (Colom.), 
available at http://juriscol.banrep.gov.co (search for 2651 under “Decretos”) [hereinafter Decree 
2651/91]; L. 446/98, julio 7, 1998, D.O. (Colom.), available at http://juriscol.banrep.gov.co (search for 
446 under “Leyes”), implemented by Decree 1818/98, translated in part in 36 Legal Bulletin (Aug. 31, 
1998 and Sept./Oct. 1998) [hereinafter Law No. 446/98].  Law No. 640/01 discusses conciliation and 
amends Law No. 446/98 and Law No. 23/91. See L. 640/01, enero 5, 2001, D.O. (Colom.), available at 
http://juriscol.banrep.gov.co (search for 640 under “Leyes”) (additional provisions reprinted at L. 
640/01, enero 24, 2007, D.O. (Colom.)) [hereinafter Law No. 640/01]; see also Law No. 446/98, supra; 
Law No. 23/91, supra note 82.  An unofficial English translation of Law No. 640/01 can be found in 
Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13.  Law No. 270/96, which describes the judicial nature of arbitral authority, 
was amended by Law No. 1285/09.  See L. 1285/09, enero 22, 2009, D.O. (Colom.), available at  
http://juriscol.banrep.gov.co (search for 1285 under “Leyes”) [hereinafter Law No. 1285/09]; L. 270/96, 
marzo 7, 1996, D.O. (Colom.), available at http://juriscol.banrep.gov.co (search for 270 under “Leyes”) 
[hereinafter Law No. 270/96]; U.S. EMBASSY, supra note 9, at 4.  An unofficial English translation of 
Article 13 of Law No. 270/96, as amended by Law No. 1285/09, can be found in Zuleta, 2010, supra 
note 13. 
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which governs arbitrations involving the state.87 Various provisions of the 
Colombian Constitution88 and Code of Civil Procedure89 are also relevant 
to actions involving arbitration.90 Nevertheless, this Article will focus 
primarily on Law No. 315/96 and Decree 1818/98, since they are the most 
recent and comprehensive enactments on arbitration in Colombia, with 
only occasional references to other provisions.91 
Although Law No. 315/96 suggests that it is the exclusive statutory 
authority on international arbitration, there are four reasons why U.S. 
parties must nevertheless take Decree 1818/98 into account.92 First, Law 
No. 315/96 is very sparse, and courts and arbitrators may need to rely on 
Decree 1818/98 to fill any statutory gaps that may arise.93 In this, Colombia 
is similar to the United States, which also uses domestic arbitration law 
(Chapter 1 of the FAA) in cases where the international arbitration 
statutory regime (Chapters 2 and 3 of the FAA) fails to provide adequate 
guidance.94 
Second, domestic arbitration law typically governs certain 
proceedings that arise after the conclusion of an arbitration, such as 
motions to annul or confirm an arbitral award. Colombia’s adoption of this 
approach has recently been confirmed by the Superior Tribunal of Bogotá, 
 
 87.  See L. 1150/07, julio 16, 2007, D.O. (Colom.), available at http://juriscol.banrep.gov.co 
(search for 1150 under “Leyes”) [hereinafter Law No. 1150/07]; L. 80/93, octubre 28, 1993, D.O. 
(Colom.), available  at http://juriscol.banrep.gov.co (search for 80 under “Leyes”) [hereinafter Law No. 
80/93]; Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 10.  An unofficial English translation of excerpts of Law 
No. 80/93, as amended by Law No. 1150/07, can be found in Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13.  Article 70 of 
Law No. 80/93 authorizes arbitration agreements between the state and foreign parties. See Law No. 
80/93, supra, art. 70; Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 1. 
 88.  Arbitration in Colombia is based on Article 116 of the Constitution, which reads, in part: 
“Individuals may be entrusted temporarily with the function of administering justice as jurors in 
criminal proceedings, as mediators or as arbitrators authorized by the parties to issue verdicts in law or 
in equity in [sic] the terms defined by the law.” Colombia Constitution, supra note 39, art. 116; see also 
id. arts. 13 (involving equal treatment), 28 (involving personal autonomy), 29 (involving due process), 
86 (involving acciones de tutela). 
 89.  See Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 82, arts. 693-95 (concerning exequatur proceedings). 
 90.  See Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 2. 
 91.  See Decree 1818/98, supra note 36; Law No. 315/96, supra note 35. 
 92.  See Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 2 (stating, in part, that “[i]nternational arbitration 
shall be governed in all its aspects in accordance with the provisions of this law.”); see also Decree 
1818/98, supra note 36. 
 93.  See Decree 1818/98, supra note 36; Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 2; Mantilla-Serrano, 
supra note 5, at 123; Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 3, 38. 
 94.  See 9 U.S.C. §§ 208, 307 (2006); Law No. 315/96, supra note 35; Zuleta, 2010, supra note 
13, at 3, 38.  Chapter 2 of the FAA governs arbitrations falling under the New York Convention, while 
Chapter 3 addresses arbitrations falling under the Panama Convention. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201, 301.  
However, certain sections of Chapter 2 also apply to arbitrations proceeding under Chapter 3.  See 9 
U.S.C. § 302 (incorporating Sections 202, 203, 204, 205, and 207 of the FAA by reference). 
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which stated that an arbitral award rendered by an international arbitral 
tribunal may nevertheless be subject to annulment proceedings under 
Decree 1818/98.95 This is similar to the approach taken in the United 
States, where motions to vacate an arbitral award are brought under 
Chapter 1 of the FAA.96 
Third, domestic laws and practice often influence the way courts and 
arbitrators exercise their discretion and interpret rules regarding 
international arbitration. Parties may also find their expectations regarding 
“proper” arbitral procedures affected by domestic norms. U.S. parties 
therefore need to know about Colombian domestic procedures in order to 
understand the legal culture in which Colombian judges, arbitrators and 
parties habitually operate.97 
Fourth and finally, it is possible for some disputes to be later 
characterized as domestic even though the parties originally believed the 
arbitration to constitute an international proceeding.98 Even if this only 
rarely happens, adoption of certain domestic practices may help safeguard 
an international award. Therefore, brief consideration of Decree 1818/98 is 
useful, although the discussion will be limited to those issues that are most 
relevant to U.S. parties considering arbitration in Colombia or with 
Colombian nationals.99 
 
 95.  See Gomm-Santos, supra note 28, at 15 (discussing SAP Andina y del Caribe C.A. Colombia, 
Mar. 10, 2010, which involved the International Centre of Dispute Resolution (ICDR) Arbitration Rules 
and which was decided in light of Article 161 of Decree 1818/98); see also Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, 
at 55-57. 
 96.  See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 208, 307. Although U.S. courts agree that the procedure for vacating an 
arbitral award is described in Section 10, circuits are split on the substantive standards to be used in 
such an action. For example, the Eleventh Circuit has ruled that parties may only rely on the grounds 
relating to non-enforcement of a foreign arbitral award under Article V of the New York Convention, 
even in actions to vacate an award arising out of an arbitration seated in the United States. See Industrial 
Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshütte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434, 1140-41, 1445 (11th Cir. 1998). 
The Second Circuit appears to take the view that the New York Convention does not impose any limits 
on the grounds upon which vacatur is allowed. See Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys 
“R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 22-23 (2d Cir. 1997). But see Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., Ltd., 
304 F.3d 200, 221-22 (2d Cir. 2002) (calling Toys “R” Us into question regarding its reliance on 
Section 10 of the FAA). Motions to confirm an arbitral award arising under the New York or Panama 
Convention are brought under Chapters 2 and 3 of the FAA. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 207, 302. 
 97.  For example, domestic arbitration in Colombia is a relatively formal undertaking that relies 
heavily on analogies to judicial actions. See Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 114. 
 98.  This is what happened in the TermoRio case. See Eduardo Zuleta Jaramillo, Decision C-
713/2008, Corte Constitucional [Constitutional Court], KLUWERARBITRATION (July 15, 2008), 
http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (discussing TermoRio); see infra note 371 (discussing TermoRio and 
noting the situation is unlikely to arise again). 
 99.  For a more comprehensive discussion of domestic arbitration law and practice in Colombia, 
see Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 1-69. 
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B. International Commercial Arbitration Under Colombian Law—Law 
No. 315/96 
1. Definitions and Applicability 
The analysis begins with Law No. 315/96, which governs matters 
involving international commercial arbitration in Colombia.100 The law is 
quite short, only including five articles.101 Although some commentators 
have claimed that the Colombian law is in some ways similar to the 
UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law, that appears to be something of an 
overstatement, given the comparative lengths of the two enactments.102 
However, Law. No. 315/96 does resemble the Model Arbitration Law with 
respect to its definition of an international arbitration.103 
That definition is found in Article 1 of Law No. 315/96 and includes 
three elements.104 First, the parties must have entered into an arbitration 
agreement, although they do not need to declare explicitly when doing so 
that the procedure is “international” per se.105 For a while, this issue was 
open to debate, but commentators have taken the view that a close reading 
of the statute and its legislative history suggested that the drafters simply 
meant “that there be a valid arbitration agreement,” with the determination 
of internationality relying solely on the criteria set forth in Article 1.106 
Although the courts have yet to confirm this approach, it was affirmed in 
an arbitral award rendered in 2004 under the auspices of the International 
Court of Arbitration for the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).107 
 
 100.  See Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, arts. 1-5. 
 101.  See id. 
 102.  Id.; see Model Arbitration Law, supra note 22, arts. 1-36; Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 
130-31. Some commentators believe that Colombia may be close to adopting the Model Arbitration 
Law, but that has not yet occurred. See Morales, supra note 28, at 167. 
 103.  Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 1; see Model Arbitration Law, supra note 22, art. 1(3); 
Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 2. 
 104.  See Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 1. 
 105.  See id.; Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 131 (referring to the phrase “when the parties have 
so agreed”). Arbitration agreements in international disputes need not take any particular form.  See 
Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 10. 
 106.  See Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 1; Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 131. 
 107.  See Eduardo Zuleta Jaramillo, Consorcio del Caribe (consortium formed by Ingeneria y 
Equipos del Caribe Ltda and DEEB Asociados Ltda) v. Boskalis BV, ICC Case No. 117/KGA, 
KLUWERARBITRATION (Jan. 24, 2004), http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (relying on the language of 
Law No. 315/96 and noting that a contrary interpretation would violate the New York and Panama 
Conventions, which only require that the arbitration agreement be in writing). 
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Second, Article 1 sets forth the indicia of an “international” 
arbitration.108 A proceeding will fall under Law No. 315/96 if any one of 
the following five elements exists: 
 
1.  The parties have their domicile in different States at the time of the 
conclusion of the arbitration agreement. 
2. The place of performance of the substantial part of the obligations that 
is directly linked to the object of the dispute is outside the State in which 
the parties have their main domicile. 
3. The place of arbitration is outside the State in which the parties have 
their domicile, provided this eventuality is agreed on in the arbitration 
agreement. 
4. The matter that is the object of the arbitration agreement clearly 
involves the interests of more than one State and the parties thus 
expressly agreed. 
5. The dispute referred to arbitration directly and unequivocally affects 
the interests of international commerce.109 
 
Third, Article 1 of Law No. 315/96 expressly indicates that it can be 
used as a defensive mechanism.110 Thus, a party who is named as a 
defendant in a judicial proceeding may raise the existence of the arbitration 
agreement as an objection to the jurisdiction of the court.111 
In many ways, the Colombian definition of an international arbitration 
is much simpler than that used in the United States. For example, Chapter 1 
of the FAA indicates that it applies both to domestic arbitrations and to 
arbitrations involving interstate and foreign commerce, so long as those 
arbitrations arise out of written agreements involving maritime or 
commercial transactions.112 However, Chapter 2, which was enacted some 
forty-five years later to give domestic effect to the New York Convention, 
curtails Chapter 1’s broad applicability with certain limiting language that 
 
 108.  Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 1. 
 109.  Id.; see also Posada-Villaveces, supra note 28, at 12.  The reference to “the interests of 
international commerce” or “international trade” mirrors provisions founds in the French law of 
arbitration.  See FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN, supra note 14, paras. 107-26 (discussing the 
definition of international arbitration in Article 1492 of the pre-2011 French Code of Civil Procedure); 
see also Code de procédure civile [C.P.C.] bk. IV art. 1504 (Fr.), translated in Yves Derains & 
Laurence Kiffer, France, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION Annex I (Jan 
Paulsson ed.) (Supp. 64 2011) (“An arbitration is international when international trade interests are at 
stake.”). 
 110.  See Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 1; see also Posada-Villaveces, supra note 28, at 12; 
Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 29. 
 111.  See Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 1. 
 112.  See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2006) (noting also some exclusions). 
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appears in Section 202.113 This section states that “[a]n arbitration 
agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal relationship, whether 
contractual or not, which is considered as commercial, including a 
transaction, contract, or agreement described in Section 2 of this title, falls 
under the Convention.”114 Although Chapter 2 originally referred only to 
arbitrations arising under the New York Convention, certain portions of 
Chapter 2, including Section 202, now apply to arbitrations falling under 
the Panama Convention as well, so that the reference to “the Convention” 
in Section 202 can apply to either the New York or Panama Convention .115 
At first, this language would appear to bring all disputes listed in 
Section 2 under the control of Chapters 2 or 3, leaving nothing to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of Chapter 1.116 However, Section 202 then returns a 
subset of disputes to the exclusive jurisdiction of Chapter 1, stating that: 
 
[a]n agreement or award arising out of such a relationship which is 
entirely between citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall 
under the Convention. . . .117 
 
However, Section 202 includes one more provision that brings some 
disputes that arise out of a relationship entirely between citizens of the 
United States back within the scope of Chapters 2 or 3.118 This occurs 
when: 
. . . that relationship involves property located abroad, envisages 
performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable 
relation with one or more foreign states. For the purpose of this section a 
corporation is a citizen of the United States if it is incorporated or has its 
principal place of business in the United States.119 
 
The end result is that the international chapters of the FAA apply to: 
 
 agreements or awards arising between a U.S. and foreign 
party; 
 
 113.  See 9 U.S.C. § 201. 
 114.  9 U.S.C. § 202. 
 115.  See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-02, 302. Chapter 3 of the FAA was enacted in 1990 to give domestic 
application to the Panama Convention. See 9 U.S.C. § 301. 
 116.  See 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 202. 
 117.  9 U.S.C. § 202. 
 118.  See 9 U.S.C. § 202. 
 119.  9 U.S.C. § 202. 
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 agreements or awards arising entirely between foreign 
parties; and 
 agreements or awards arising entirely between U.S. citizens, 
but only if there is some sort of international nexus (i.e., 
“property located abroad, . . . performance or enforcement 
abroad, or . . . some other reasonable relation with one or 
more foreign states”).120 
 
Any agreement or award that falls under Chapter 2 or 3 is subject not only 
to the statutory requirements set forth in that chapter, but also to the 
requirements of the relevant convention.121 
Although the United States and Colombia approach the definition of 
an international arbitration in very different manners, the results are in 
many ways similar. For example, both countries consider an arbitration to 
be international when the dispute involves parties from the home state and 
a foreign state, although some question may arise in Colombia if the 
dispute involves multiple parties, two of whom are from the same 
country.122 Similarly, foreign performance will be enough to bring a dispute 
within the scope of both Law No. 315/96 and Section 202, although 
Colombia requires a “substantial part of the obligations” to be performed 
outside the place where the parties are domiciled and the United States 
does not indicate what proportion of the performance must be foreign.123 
Foreign-seated arbitrations are also considered international under both 
statutes, although questions have been raised in the United States as to 
whether a foreign seat is enough to bring an arbitration between two U.S. 
citizens within the scope of the New York or Panama Conventions.124 
 
 120.  9 U.S.C. § 202. 
 121.  See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201, 301. 
 122.  See 9 U.S.C. § 202; Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 1(1). This would be similar to the 
kinds of problems associated with diversity jurisdiction in U.S. federal courts, although there is no 
indication that Colombia would analyze the issue in a similar manner. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006). 
 123.  See 9 U.S.C. § 202; Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 1(2). 
 124.  See 9 U.S.C. § 202; Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 1(3). Although these are clearly 
“foreign” arbitrations under the New York Convention, based on geographic considerations, U.S. courts 
have occasionally held that Chapter 2 of the FAA does not apply to these types of disputes. See Wilson 
v. Lignotock U.S.A. Inc., 709 F. Supp. 797, 799 (E.D. Mich. 1989). However, this question has seldom 
been addressed and therefore remains relatively open. Thus, it may be that seating an arbitration outside 
the United States creates a reasonable relationship with a foreign state sufficient to bring the arbitration 
within the scope of Section 202 of the FAA, “at least where this was not an effort to circumvent local 
regulatory protections.” BORN (ICA), supra note 15, at 293-94 (citing analogies to Section 1-105 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code). The issue does not appear to have been raised in the U.S. with respect to 
the Panama Convention. See Panama Convention, supra note 20. 
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However, some substantive differences may exist. For example, Law 
No. 315/96 indicates that an arbitration is international under Colombian 
law if “[t]he matter that is the object of the arbitration agreement clearly 
involves the interests of more than one State and the parties thus expressly 
agreed” or “[t]he dispute referred to arbitration directly and unequivocally 
affects the interests of international commerce.”125 While these types of 
disputes may be the same as those that fall under the FAA’s “reasonable 
relation” provision, the language of Law No. 315/96 appears to focus on 
state interests rather than the parties’ private connections with the foreign 
state.126 This may limit or expand the Colombian definition of 
“international arbitration,” depending on the circumstances. 
Law No. 315/96 reflects a second difference from the FAA. As a rule, 
U.S. jurisprudence does not use the term “international” arbitration, instead 
referring to “Convention” proceedings, where “Convention” can refer to 
either the New York or Panama Convention.127 U.S. cases also refer to 
“foreign” arbitrations or awards, on the one hand, and “non-domestic” 
arbitrations or awards, on the other.128 This distinction arises because the 
New York Convention can apply not only to awards arising out of 
arbitrations seated at a place other than that of enforcement (i.e., foreign 
awards) but also to awards “not considered as domestic awards in the State 
where their recognition and enforcement are sought.”129 As a matter of 
national law, the United States has decided to grant Convention treatment 
to some awards that arise out of arbitrations seated in the United States.130 
The phrasing of Section 202 of the FAA suggests that the concept of non-
domesticity will be applied not only to awards and arbitrations arising 
under the New York Convention, but also to those arising under the 
Panama Convention, even though the Panama Convention does not include 
language regarding non-domestic awards in the same way that the New 
York Convention does.131 
 
 125.  See Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 1(4)-(5). 
 126.  See 9 U.S.C. § 202; Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 1(4)-(5). 
 127.  See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-307. 
 128.  See S.I. Strong, What Constitutes an “Agreement in Writing” in International Commercial 
Arbitration? Conflicts Between the New York Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act, 48 STAN. J. 
INT’L L. (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Strong, Writing]. 
 129.  New York Convention, supra note 19, art. I(1). 
 130.  See 9 U.S.C. §§ 202, 302 (2006). 
 131.  New York Convention, supra note 19, art. I(1); see also Panama Convention, supra note 20; 9 
U.S.C. §§ 202, 302; Bowman, supra note 52, at 134-40. 
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Notably, states do not have to extend New York Convention treatment 
to awards rendered within their territory.132 Instead, numerous countries, 
including Colombia, only apply the New York Convention to awards and 
agreements associated with foreign-seated arbitrations.133 While it is 
unclear whether and to what extent these issues will affect arbitrations 
proceeding under the Panama Convention, commentators have suggested 
that courts should construe the two conventions similarly, despite the 
Panama Convention’s focus on “international” arbitrations rather than 
“foreign” or “non-domestic” arbitrations.134 
2. Relationship to Other Provisions of Law 
The next item to consider is the relationship of Law No. 315/96 to 
other statutory enactments. Article 2 indicates that Law No. 315/96, along 
with any relevant treaties, conventions and other international agreements, 
is the sole provision governing international arbitration under Colombian 
law.135 In this, Colombia has taken an approach similar to that of the United 
States, in that international conventions are not simply given direct 
domestic application but are instead embedded within national statutes that 
illuminate and expand upon the treaty itself.136 However, despite the 
apparent exclusivity of Article 2, Decree 1818/98 is allowed to fill certain 
gaps in the Colombian arbitral regime even though Law No. 315/96 does 
not include any language similar to that found in Chapters 2 and 3 of the 
FAA specifically providing for residual application of domestic law.137 
Article 2 also states that Law No. 315/96 “prevail[s] over the 
provisions laid down in respect of the specific matters in the Code of Civil 
Procedure.”138 This language is particularly useful because it underscores 
the difference between international and domestic arbitration, since the 
latter can be heavily influenced by judicial procedures and rules.139 The 
 
 132.  See New York Convention, supra note 19, art. 1; BORN (ICA), supra note 15, at 2365-67, 
2377-81. 
 133.  See INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 40, para. 4. 
 134.  See BORN (ICA), supra note 15, at 2384-85. 
 135.  See Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 2. 
 136.  See id.; 9 U.S.C. §§ 201, 301. Although most states take this approach, some simply give the 
New York Convention direct application domestically. See BORN (ICA), supra note 15, at 99-100. 
 137.  See 9 U.S.C. §§ 208, 307; Law No. 315/96, supra note 35; Decree 1818/98, supra note 36; 
Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 123; Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 3, 38. 
 138.  Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 2. 
 139.  See Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 114, 132. 
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FAA has no similar language, although case law has established the same 
principle in the United States.140 
3. Party Autonomy 
Article 2 is not limited to discussing the relationship between Law No. 
315/96 and other provisions of national and international law.141 This 
article also contains important language regarding the extent of party 
autonomy in international arbitration and was indeed the first instance of 
broad legislative acceptance of party autonomy in Colombian arbitration 
law.142 
The language regarding autonomy in Article 2 addresses both 
procedural and substantive issues.143 For example, parties are explicitly 
permitted to determine the applicable substantive law that will govern the 
merits of the dispute.144 This is a departure from domestic arbitration, 
which requires the use of Colombian substantive law in certain 
circumstances.145 
Furthermore, parties to an international dispute are permitted to 
determine the procedures that will apply to the arbitration.146 The 
agreement regarding the governing procedure may be outlined explicitly in 
the arbitration agreement itself or may be determined implicitly, as through 
the adoption of institutional rules.147 Article 2 even goes so far as to include 
a list of elements that may be subject to the agreement of the parties, 
including notification procedures, constitution of the tribunal (including 
appointment mechanisms and the nationality of the tribunal members), 
language of the arbitration and the seat of the arbitration.148 Law No. 
315/96 specifically states that the arbitration may be seated in Colombia or 
elsewhere.149 
 
 140.  See BORN (ICA), supra note 15, at 1334-36 (noting rules of civil procedure are not applicable 
in arbitration absent very clear party agreement). 
 141.  See Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 2. 
 142.  See id.; Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 132. 
 143.  See Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 2. 
 144.  See id. Nevertheless, one commentator has suggested putting the choice of substantive law 
provision in the arbitration agreement itself, rather than in a separate clause, for the avoidance of 
confusion. See Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 132. 
 145.  See infra note 191. 
 146.  See Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 2. 
 147.  See id. International arbitrations may not only proceed under the institutional rules of non-
Colombian organizations, but may also be administered by them. See Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, 
para. 15. 
 148.  See Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 2. 
 149.  See id. 
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The scope of party autonomy in Colombia appears on its face to be as 
broad as that permitted under U.S. law.150 However, U.S. parties need to be 
careful about reading Law No. 315/96 in isolation.151 For example, even 
though Article 1 states that an arbitration is considered international if the 
“parties have their domicile in different States at the time of the conclusion 
of the arbitration agreement” and Article 2 provides a broad grant of 
autonomy for parties to an international arbitration, some questions may 
arise as a result of Article 13 of Law No. 270/96, as modified by Article 6 
of Law No. 1285/09, which states that arbitrations between private parties 
and Colombian state entities must adhere to what is known as “legal” 
arbitration under Colombian law.152 While this could be interpreted as 
suggesting that foreign parties who enter into arbitration agreements with 
state entities will not be allowed to choose the procedures that govern the 
arbitration to the same extent as they do in purely private transactions,153 
the better reading of the various statutes appears to be that this limitation on 
the type of arbitration that may be used in a dispute involving a state party 
does not apply to contracts involving foreign parties.154 
Issues relating to the extent of party autonomy in contracts between 
foreign parties and state entities demonstrate the difficulty of statutory 
interpretation in Colombia arbitration law.  Not only is it important to have 
access to all of the relevant laws in their most up-to-date forms, it is 
necessary to consider the interplay between interpretive principles such as 
 
 150.  See UHC Mgmt Co. v. Computer Sci. Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 995-96 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting 
Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)); 
BORN (ICA), supra note 15, at 1752-53 (noting the FAA is silent on this issue, but that broad autonomy 
has been firmly established by case law). 
 151.  See Law No. 315/96, supra note 35. 
 152.  See Law No. 1285/09, supra note 86, art. 6 (stating, in part, that “[w]ith respect to arbitrations 
where the Government or one of its entities is not a party, private persons may agree to the procedural 
rules to be applied, either directly or by making reference to those of an Arbitration Centre respecting, 
in any event, Constitutional due process principles”); Law No. 270/96, supra note 86, art. 13; Law No. 
315/96, supra note 35, arts. 1-2; U.S. EMBASSY, supra note 9, at 5; infra notes 217-18 and 
accompanying text (describing “legal” arbitration). Law No. 1285/09 was preceded by a decision of the 
Colombian Constitutional Court stating that the requirement of legal arbitration was justified in 
domestic disputes on the grounds that the public interests at stake required that the legislature, rather 
than the parties, be the one to regulate arbitration involving the state or state parties. See Law No. 
1285/09, supra note 86; Decision C-713/2008, supra note 98; see also U.S. EMBASSY, supra note 9, at 
5. 
 153.  See U.S. EMBASSY, supra note 9, at 5. 
 154.  See Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 132 (citing Article 4 of Law No. 315/96); Zuleta, 2010, 
supra note 13, at 11; see also Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, arts. 4-5; Law No. 80/93, supra note 87, 
art. 70 (amended by Law No. 1150/07); see infra notes 181-207 and accompanying text. 
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lex specialis and lex posterior, particularly as those concepts are used in 
civil law statutory analysis.155 
4. Confirmation of Awards 
One of the major innovations of the New York Convention, also 
reflected in the Panama Convention, is the abolition of double exequatur, 
which required parties to confirm an award at the place where it was 
rendered before taking it to another location for enforcement.156 However, 
exequatur proceedings are not prohibited by either of the two Conventions 
when such procedures are a required part of a state’s domestic enforcement 
mechanism.157 
Exequatur constitutes a judicial recognition that an arbitral award is 
proper, and some states, including Colombia, require parties to obtain 
exequatur before an award may be enforced in a second, separate 
proceeding.158 The process is quite time-consuming, often taking from one 
to three years.159 Once the exequatur proceedings have been successfully 
completed, the prevailing party can ask the court to enforce the award 
through an execution proceeding (proceso ejecutivo).160 
Parties to international arbitrations are not exempt from requirements 
regarding exequatur.  Two separate analyses are necessary, one regarding 
 
 155.  See Diane A. Desierto, Necessity and “Supplementary Means of Interpretation” for Non-
precluded Measures in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 827, 894 n.210 (2010); 
David C. Donald, Approaching Comparative Company Law, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 83, 90 
(2008); John Linarelli, Analytical Jurisprudence and the Concept of Commercial Law, 114 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 119, 142-43, 162 (2009). 
 156.  See BORN (ICA), supra note 15, at 2338 (noting neither the New York nor the Panama 
Convention requires double exequatur). 
 157.  Most parties comply with arbitral awards voluntarily. See NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN 
AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION para. 11.02 (2009); U.S. EMBASSY, supra note 9, at 
12. Nevertheless, there may be times when parties either wish or need to undertake exequatur 
proceedings. See BORN (ICA), supra note 15, at 2329, 2338, 2343. 
 158.  See INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 40, paras. 7, 11 (noting two-step process); 
Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 47. “Enforcement” is the process in which a court brings its coercive 
powers to bear on a party who has not complied with the terms of the award. 
 159.  See Posada-Villaveces, supra note 28, at 12. Other experts indicate that the enforcement of a 
foreign judgment takes from three to four years. See Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 45. Actions 
to recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards may only be brought in the Civil Chamber of the 
Supreme Court of Justice. See U.S. EMBASSY, supra note 9, at 7; INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 
supra note 40, para. 7. Actions to annul an award are brought in lower courts known as tribunales 
superiores de distrito judicial. See U.S. EMBASSY, supra note 9, at 7; INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 
supra note 40, para. 7. 
 160.  See Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 133 (noting such actions should be brought in the 
competent court); Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 43 (noting limited grounds for objection based on 
Article 509(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure). 
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awards rendered outside Colombia and one regarding awards rendered 
inside the country. 
Awards that arise out of arbitrations seated outside Colombia are 
considered “foreign” under Article 3 of Law No. 315/96 and may therefore 
be enforced pursuant to the terms of the New York or Panama 
Convention.161 At one time such awards were also required to comply with 
Colombian exequatur proceedings, as outlined in Articles 694 and 695 of 
the Colombian Code of Civil Procedure.162 
However, difficulties with this approach arose as a result of the New 
York Convention, which permits states to use their own methods of 
recognition and enforcement of foreign awards only so long as “[t]here 
shall not be imposed substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees 
or charges on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to which 
this Convention applies.”163 At first, the Colombian Supreme Court of 
Justice addressed this issue by indicating that exequatur procedures could 
be combined with enforcement proceedings under the New York or 
Panama Convention, thus allowing all issues to be determined at a single 
time, in a single forum.164  However, a July 2011 decision of the Supreme 
Court of Justice clearly indicates that Colombia courts now only need to 
apply the criteria found in the New York or Panama Convention.165 
 
 161.  See New York Convention, supra note 19, arts. I, III; Panama Convention, supra note 20, art. 
4; Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 3. 
 162.  See Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 3; Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 82, arts. 693-
95 (concerning exequatur proceedings); Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, paras. 44, 46 (describing 
procedure for obtaining exequatur in detail); see also BRIGARD & URRUTIA ABOGADOS, supra note 28, 
at 19.  Colombia has also instituted an unusual rule that shifts the normal burden of proof under the 
Panama Convention, effectively requiring prevailing parties to demonstrate that the award is final. See 
Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 47 (citing Merck & Co. Inc. v. Technoquímicas S.A., XXVI Y.B. COM. 
ARB. 260 (2001)). 
 163.  New York Convention, supra note 19, art. III; see also Encyclopaedia Universalis SA v. 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 403 F.3d 85, 90, 92 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting parties cannot rely on 
rationales based on Section 10 of the FAA or developed through the common law in an action to 
enforce a foreign arbitral award); Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale De 
L’Industrie Du Papier (RATKA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974) (noting objections to enforcement 
are to be construed narrowly). The Panama Convention is silent on this issue. See Panama Convention, 
supra note 20. 
 164.  See Sunward Overseas S.A. v. Servicios Maritimos Ltd., 20 Nov. 1992, XX Y.B. COMM. 
ARB. 651, 653 (1992) (noting Article III of the New York Convention allowed domestic procedures to 
be used in actions to enforce a foreign arbitral award); INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 40, 
para. 20; Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 133; Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 47. Sunward 
Overseas is summarized in Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 50. 
 165.  See Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J][Supreme Court], Sala de Casacion Civil, Julio 27, 
2011, No. 11001-0203-000-2007-01956-00, at 3, 17,  available in Spanish at http://190.24.134.121/ 
webcsj/Documentos/Novedades/Archivo/Civil/1100102030002007-01956-00%20[27-07-211].pdf 
(considering an arbitral award rendered in New York and noting that Article III of the New York 
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The next question to consider is whether awards rendered in Colombia 
are subject to exequatur proceedings, even if the arbitration is considered 
“international” under Law No. 315/96.166 Interestingly, there has been some 
debate on this point, with some commentators claiming that such awards 
should not be subject to exequatur proceedings.167 However, most 
authorities appear to suggest that awards rendered in international 
arbitrations seated in Colombia are indeed subject to exequatur 
proceedings.168 This approach is potentially problematic, in that an award 
rendered in an international arbitration could be subject not only to 
challenges made during the exequatur proceedings but also to separate 
actions to set aside or revise the award.169 Additional guidance from the 
Supreme Court of Justice on this issue would be welcome and may perhaps 
be forthcoming given the Court’s recent activity in this area.170 
U.S. treatment of awards rendered in the United States is somewhat 
different than that of Colombia because the United States recognizes the 
concept of “non-domestic” awards.171 Thus, awards that are made in the 
United States but that are nevertheless subject to the New York or Panama 
Convention can be confirmed under Section 207 of the FAA.172 According 
to Section 207, a U.S. court “shall confirm the award unless it finds one of 
the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the 
award specified in the said Convention.”173 Recourse may not be had to 
Section 10 of the FAA, which addresses vacatur of an award rendered in 
the United States, or to any of the potential common law bases for vacating 
an award, such as manifest disregard of law.174 Parties to an award that falls 
 
Convention prohibits use of domestic enforcement procedures that are more onerous than those found 
in the Convention and refusing to apply Article 694 of the Code of Civil Procedure). 
 166.  See New York Convention, supra note 19, art. III; Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 1. 
 167.  See Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 132-33 (claiming in 2002 that “[a] minority of the 
Colombian legal community considers that awards rendered in Colombia in an international arbitration, 
although being ‘Colombian’ awards, should be subject to exequatur”). 
 168.  See INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 40, para. 4; Posada-Villaveces, supra note 
28, at 12; Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 13. 
 169.  See Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 133. 
 170.  See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 171.  See New York Convention, supra note 19, art. I(1); see supra notes 128-31 and 
accompanying text. This provision is made applicable to awards arising under the Panama Convention 
by virtue of Section 302 of the FAA. See id. § 302. 
 172.  See 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2006). 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 302, 307; Duferco Int’l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 
F.3d 383, 389 (2d Cir. 2003) (describing test for manifest disregard); see also supra note 96 and 
accompanying text (regarding vacatur and Section 10). The continuing availability of manifest 
disregard as a grounds for vacatur in the United States is less than clear, despite several recent U.S. 
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under the international chapters of the FAA have three years in which to 
bring a motion to confirm the award, which is considerably longer than the 
one-year period for confirming a domestic award.175 
Questions sometimes arise about the enforceability of partial 
awards.176 Colombian courts have expressed doubts about their ability to 
enforce partial awards.177 However, the issue remains open, since the one 
court to address the issue did so only in dicta.178 U.S. courts will enforce 
provisional or interim measures ordered by an arbitral tribunal to the extent 
that the measure in question constitutes a final disposition of the matter 
requested.179 
5. Arbitrability and State Contracts 
The arbitrability of state contracts is a somewhat complicated issue in 
Colombia. The primary statutory provision on this subject is Article 4 of 
Law No. 315/96, which amends Article 70 of Law No. 80/1993 concerning 
state contracts.180 
The fact that Article 4 is meant to amend Law No. 80/1993 is 
instructive, since it means that the entire paragraph is to be read in the 
context of state contracts.181 Article 4 states that all contracts with foreign 
parties (meaning state contracts with foreign parties) may be referred to 
international arbitration.182 Furthermore, Article 4 indicates that several 
 
Supreme Court pronouncements on the subject. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 
S. Ct. 1758, 1768 n.3 (2010); Hall Street Assoc., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008). 
 175.  See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 207, 302. 
 176.  See LEW ET AL., supra note 15, paras. 9-2 to 9-4. 
 177.  See Empresa Colombiana de Vías Férreas (Ferrovías) v. Drummond Ltd., No. 25.261, 
(Consejo de Estado, Apr. 27, 2004), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com [hereinafter 
Empresa Colombiana, Apr. 27, 2004]; see also Empresa Colombiana de Vías Férreas (Ferrovías) v. 
Drummond Ltd., No. 25.261, (Consejo de Estado, Apr. 22, 2004), available at 
http://www.kluwerarbitration.com [hereinafter Empresa Colombiana, Apr. 22, 2004]; Empresa 
Colombiana de Vías Férreas (Ferrovías) v. Drummond Ltd., No. 25.25, (Consejo de Estado, Oct. 24, 
2003), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com [hereinafter Empresa Colombiana, Oct. 24, 
2003]; Uran-Bidegain, supra note 28.  Empresa Colombiana, Oct. 24, 2003, is also summarized at 
Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 56-57. 
 178.  See Empresa Colombiana, Apr. 27, 2004, supra note 177. 
 179.  See Arrowhead Global Solutions, Inc. v. Datapath, Inc., 166 Fed. Appx. 39, 47 (4th Cir. 
2006); Publicis Comm. v. True North Comm., Inc., 206 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2000) (focusing on “a 
document’s . . . substance and impact to determine whether the decision is final” for purposes of 
enforcement). 
 180.  See Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 4; Law No. 80/93, supra note 87, art. 70. 
 181.  See Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 4; Law No. 80/93, supra note 87, art. 70. 
 182.  See Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 4; Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 132. Although it 
would be possible to argue that state contracts with foreign parties would also fall under Article 1(1), 
which states that “[a]n arbitration is international when . . . [t]he parties have their domicile in different 
States at the time of the conclusion of the arbitration agreement,” the specificity of Article 4 and the 
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other types of domestic state contracts—those “providing for long-term 
financing and payment thereof through the exploitation of the object that 
has been built or the operation of goods for carrying out a public service”—
may also be made subject to the more liberal procedures associated with 
international arbitration.183 
Article 4 is a significant concession on the part of Colombia, since the 
arbitrability of state contracts has been and remains a highly political 
subject in both the judicial and legislative spheres.184 However, U.S. parties 
should be cautious about taking the breadth of Article 4 at face value 
because of certain unspoken assumptions about arbitrability.185 
Arbitrability is a concept that that can confuse U.S. parties due to the 
way the term is defined in the United States. In most countries, arbitrability 
is a public law concern going to whether a country will permit a particular 
subject matter to be resolved through arbitration.186 In the United States, 
however, the term refers primarily to “[t]he question whether the parties 
have submitted a particular dispute to arbitration.”187 As such, arbitrability 
in the United States is often viewed as a private matter that goes to the 
scope of the parties’ agreement. Although it is important for parties to 
consider issues relating to the scope of their arbitration agreement, it is 
perhaps even more important that they understand national restrictions on 
arbitrability (in the international sense) so as to avoid having the arbitration 
agreement and any future awards ruled unenforceable.188 
 
reference to Law No. 80/93 trumps this reading.  See Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 4; Law No. 
80/93, supra note 87, art. 70 
 183.  See Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 4. 
 184.  See U.S. EMBASSY, supra note 9, at 10, 15; Uran-Bidegain, supra note 28 (citing 
Departamento del Valle del Cauca and Ferrovías as supportive of the arbitrability of state contracts, but 
suggesting Decision C-961/2006 restricted the arbitrability of some contracts). Often the issue arises as 
a constitutional matter, with claims having been made that arbitrating certain matters deemed to be non-
arbitrable violates the fundamental right to due process reflected in Article 28 of the Colombian 
Constitution. See Eduardo Zuleta Jaramillo, 22 March 2006 – Colombian Constitutional Court, 
KLUWERARBITRATION, (Mar. 22, 2006), http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (describing the overturning 
of Decision T-481/2005 of May 2005 between Departamento del Valle, a public entity, and 
Concesiones de Infraestructuras S.A.) [hereinafter Decision 22 March 2006]; see infra note 369 
(quoting Article 28). However, this argument was ultimately unsuccessful, at least in cases where “the 
issue of whether the awarded decided on matters not subject to arbitration is a reasonable debate.” 
Decision 22 March 2006, supra (involving a unilateral liquidation of an agreement, something that had 
been considered a prerogative of the state and thus non-arbitrable until that point); see also Uran-
Bidegain, supra note 28. Although Decision 22 March 2006 was decided in the domestic context, the 
analytical approach will surely apply in international disputes as well. 
 185.  See Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 4. 
 186.  See LEW ET AL., supra note 15, paras. 9-2 to 9-4 (discussing objective arbitrability). 
 187.  Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) (citations omitted). 
 188.  See LEW ET AL., supra note 15, paras. 9-2 to 9-4. 
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Therefore, Article 4 should not be read as allowing all disputes with 
foreigners to be arbitrable, or even all disputes involving foreigners and 
state parties. Instead, U.S. parties must look elsewhere to determine 
whether the subject matter of the dispute is amenable to arbitration. Several 
known exceptions already exist, such as disputes with foreign parties 
arising under the Investment Stability Law (Law No. 963/05).189 Similar 
limitations arise with respect to state contracts involving long-term 
financing.190 Thus, Article 4 should be read as simply allowing state 
contracts with foreigners to be subject to a certain type of procedure (i.e., 
international arbitration) rather than the usual type of arbitral procedure 
used in state contracts (i.e., “legal” arbitration), subject to certain specific 
limitations.191 
This raises the question of what the scope of arbitrability is in 
Colombia, both with regard to public and private contracts, since “[t]he 
restrictions on arbitrability under Colombian law are ratione materiae and 
not ratione personae.”192 Some guidance may be found in the Colombian 
Civil Code, which states that parties may only submit “freely disposable 
rights” to arbitration.193 Some matters, “such as criminal, tax, family rights, 
and certain state contract decisions (actos administrativos),” are therefore 
considered non-arbitrable.194 Although these provisions are typically 
considered to refer to domestic disputes, some of these issues would appear 
 
 189.  For example, the Constitutional Court has stated that because disputes arising under the 
Investment Stability Law (Law No. 963/05) are a type of administrative contract that are intended to 
guarantee consistent application of Colombia law to investors, the only type of arbitration possible is 
domestic arbitration governed by Colombian law. See Uran-Bidegain, supra note 28 (discussing 
Decision C-961/2006, decided on Nov. 22, 2006); see also DG&A ABOGADOS, COLOMBIA: THE PLACE 
TO INVEST 17-18 (2009); A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, National Laws Providing for Stability of International 
Investment Contracts: A Comparative Perspective, 8 J. WORLD INVEST. & TRADE 1, 6 (2007). 
 190.  See Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 11 (noting contracts with the Colombian Hydrocarbons 
Agency that involve exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons may not be submitted to international 
arbitration). 
 191.  See Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 4; Law No. 80/93, supra note 87, art. 70; see also 
Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 11; see infra notes 215-19 and accompanying text (regarding arbitration 
at law and “legal” arbitration). 
 192.  Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 11 (noting “[t]he State, State entities, and State-controlled 
entities, as well as private individuals, may enter into arbitration agreements, both for local and 
international arbitration”). 
 193.  See CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.], arts. 15, 2470, available in Spanish at http://www.secretariasenado 
.gov.co/senado/basedoc/codigo/codigo_civil.html#1 (select article number in drop-down box marked 
“Articulo”) [hereinafter Civil Code]; Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 116; Zuleta, 2010, supra note 
13, at 12. 
 194.  Arango & Parra, supra note 13, at 56; Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 9; see also Civil 
Code, supra note 193, arts. 2469-87 (discussing various restrictions on arbitrability). 
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to be equally non-arbitrable in the international sphere.195 For example, it is 
unlikely that Colombian courts would allow criminal matters to be 
arbitrated, simply because a foreign party was involved. 
The Colombian Constitutional Court has also held that “arbitrators 
cannot decide on matters involving public policy, sovereignty, the 
constitutional system, or the legality of administrative acts,” although 
arbitrators “may rule on the economic effects” of certain administrative 
decisions.196 Antitrust and consumer disputes are also not amenable to 
arbitration as matter of statutory law.197 Again, at least some of these 
subjects would appear non-arbitrable in international as well as domestic 
cases. 
Therefore, U.S. parties should be cautious about attempting to 
arbitrate disputes that deviate too far from core commercial concerns.198 
Furthermore, U.S. parties should be aware that their views about what 
constitutes a “commercial” dispute may be slightly skewed, since U.S. 
courts have defined the concept much more broadly than courts in other 
states have.199 Thus, for example, U.S. courts have held that the concept of 
commerciality refers not only to the prototypical commercial relationship 
exemplified by the purchase and sale of goods between two corporations, 
but also to disputes involving employers and employees, consumers, 
shareholders, foreign state actors, antitrust issues, foreign regulatory 
authorities, insurers and reinsurers and maritime matters.200 Furthermore, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has held that policies in favor of arbitration should 
be given heightened respect in the international realm, which suggests that 
arbitrability will be defined even more broadly in international disputes 
than in domestic ones.201 
 
 195.  Most countries exclude these subjects from the scope of arbitrable matters. See LEW ET AL., 
supra note 15, paras. 9-23 to 9-24. 
 196.  Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 9 (citing Constitutional Court Decisions C-1436/2000 
and SU-174/2007); see also U.S. EMBASSY, supra note 9, at 8-9 (citing Constitution Court Decisions C-
1436/2000 and SU-174/2007 and Council of State Decisions of Feb. 23, 2000, June 8, 2000 and June 
10, 2009); Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 12. 
 197.  See Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 9 (citing Article 6 of Law No. 1340/09 and Article 
42 of Decree 3466/82). 
 198.  U.S. parties should also be aware that some Colombian parties, particularly state entities, may 
not wish to enter into arbitration agreements as a matter of practice, even if they are permitted to do so 
by law. See Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 4 (using discretionary language “it can be agreed”); 
U.S. EMBASSY, supra note 9, at 8. 
 199.  See BORN (ICA), supra note 15, at 262; STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 38. 
 200.  See BORN (ICA), supra note 15, at 262. 
 201.  See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985) 
(stating “concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational 
tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for predictability in the 
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Although the United States appears to reflect a somewhat broader 
acceptance of the notion of arbitrability than Colombia does202 as well as a 
more generous definition of the concept of a commercial dispute, the 
Colombian approach to arbitration of state contracts is significantly more 
liberal than that in the United States. Indeed, a number of statutory 
provisions limit or prohibit the United States from engaging in binding 
arbitration agreements with private parties.203 Furthermore, a number of 
“U.S. courts have held that the United States generally cannot enter into 
enforceable arbitration agreements with private parties.”204 Although U.S. 
courts and government agencies may be relaxing their positions on this 
matter to some degree,205 Colombia clearly allows a wider range of state 
contracts to be arbitrated than the United States does.206 
6. Supremacy 
Finally, Article 5 of Law No. 315/96 repeals any laws that are 
contrary to its terms.207 However, this does not mean that domestic laws 
will never apply to an international arbitration. Instead, it is implicitly 
recognized that Law No. 315/96 can be supplemented by provisions 
regarding domestic arbitration, to the extent that a gap exists in the 
international regime.208  Those provisions are discussed in the next section. 
 
resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties’ agreement, even assuming that a contrary 
result would be forthcoming in a domestic context”); see also Francisco v. Stolt Achievement MT, 293 
F.3d 270, 274-75 (5th Cir. 2002); LEW ET AL., supra note 15, para. 9-36. 
 202.  The United States has been said to reflect perhaps the broadest approach to arbitrability in the 
world. Notably, some of Colombia’s limitations are procedural only, in that certain types of arbitrations 
must be subject to Colombian law and procedure rather than being made subject to the more liberal 
provisions relating to international arbitration. See supra note 192. Nevertheless, the underlying 
disputes still may be arbitrated. 
 203.  See United States v. Bankers Ins. Co., 245 F.3d 315, 319-20 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4083(b)). Since these provisions do not appear in the FAA, they may be as difficult for non-U.S. 
parties to find as restrictions on Colombian state arbitration are for U.S. parties to find. 
 204.  BORN (ICA), supra note 15, at 630 (citing BV Bureau Wijsmuller v. United States, 1976 
A.M.C. 2514 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)); Stevens Tech. Serv., Inc. v. United States, 913 F.2d 1521, 1534 (11th 
Cir. 1990). 
 205.  See Bankers Ins. Co., 245 F.3d at 319-20. The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the 
Senior Counsel for Alternative Dispute Resolution, has also issued a policy statement regarding the use 
of alternative dispute resolution measures, including arbitration, although that policy statement does not 
create any rights in itself.  See Policy on the Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution, and Case 
Identification Criteria for Alternative Dispute Resolution, 61 Fed. Reg. 36895-02 (July 15, 1996). 
 206.  See Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 4; Law No. 80/93, supra note 87, arts. 70-71. State 
contracts are also subject to conciliation efforts. See id. arts. 68-69. 
 207.  See Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 5. 
 208.  See id.; Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 123. 
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C. Domestic Arbitration Under Colombian Law—Decree 1818/98 
Domestic arbitration in Colombia is primarily governed by Decree 
1818/98,209 supplemented by various other statutory provisions.210 
Although Law No. 315/96 ostensibly preempts Decree 1818/98 in matters 
relating to international arbitration, Decree 1818/98 remains relevant to 
disputes involving U.S. parties by filling any gaps left by Law No. 315/96 
and by applying to some kinds of arbitration, such as those involving 
certain kinds of state contracts, that may not be decided pursuant to 
Colombia’s international arbitral regime.211 Therefore, this Article will 
discuss certain aspects of Decree 1818/98, focusing on those issues that are 
of particular interest to U.S. parties contemplating arbitration in Colombia 
or with Colombian entities.212 
Before beginning a detailed analysis of specific statutory provisions, it 
is helpful to identify the three types of domestic arbitration that are 
available in Colombia under Decree 1818/98.213 These include “arbitration 
in law” (meaning that the arbitrators must decide according to strict 
application of the governing legal principles), “arbitration in equity” (what 
in international circles is known as deciding ex aequo et bono or as an 
amiable compositeur), and “technical arbitration” (which might be 
analogized to expert determination).214 Different procedures and standards 
of arbitrator conduct apply to each type of arbitration.215 
Decree 1818/98 also describes three types of arbitral procedures that 
may be used to resolve domestic disputes: ad hoc arbitration, wherein the 
parties establish their own unique procedures; institutional arbitration, 
wherein the parties agree to the application of rules promulgated by a 
national or international arbitral organization; and “legal” arbitration, 
wherein the rules of arbitral procedure are identical to those used in 
litigation.216 “Legal” arbitration is the default provision in domestic 
 
 209.  See Decree 1818/98, supra note 36. 
 210.  See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text. 
 211.  See Decree 1818/98, supra note 36; Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, arts. 4-5; Mantilla-
Serrano, supra note 5, at 123. 
 212.  See Decree 1818/98, supra note 36. More comprehensive analysis of Colombia’s domestic 
arbitration scheme is available elsewhere. See Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 1-80. 
 213.  See Decree 1818/98, supra note 36, art. 115 (also found in Article 1 of Decree 2279/89); 
Leichtling & Paredes, supra note 31, at 43; Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 116. 
 214.  See Decree 1818/98, supra note 36, art. 115; Decree 2279/89, supra note 82, art. 1; Mantilla-
Serrano, supra note 5, at 116; see also LEW ET AL., supra note 15, para. 1-34 (describing expert 
determination), paras. 18-86 to 18-96 (differentiating acting as an amiable compositeur from deciding 
ex aequo et bono). 
 215.  See Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 114, 116-17. 
 216.  See id. at 116-17; Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 22-23. 
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disputes, which means that parties who do not specify the procedure to be 
used in their arbitration or who leave gaps in their chosen procedures will 
have a quasi-judicial proceeding.217 
U.S. parties are not subject to the domestic default rule regarding 
“legal” arbitration.218 Instead, whenever U.S. and Colombian parties fail to 
agree regarding the applicable procedure, the IACAC Arbitration Rules 
will automatically apply pursuant to Article 3 of the Panama Convention, 
which is given domestic application in Colombia by virtue of Law. No. 
44/86 and Article 2 of Law No. 315/96.219 
The IACAC Arbitration Rules are very similar to the types of 
international arbitration rules promulgated by private institutions, 
containing standard provisions regarding written submissions, including the 
notice of arbitration, the statement of claim, the statement of defense and 
further submissions; the appointment and challenge of arbitrators; 
jurisdictional issues; arbitral procedure, including the taking and 
presentation of evidence, interim measures of protection, default and 
settlement; rendering of the award, including any corrections thereof or 
additional elements; and fees.220 Since 2002, the International Centre for 
Dispute Resolution (the ICDR, also known as the international arm of the 
American Arbitration Association) has been responsible for administering 
IACAC arbitrations.221 The Centro de Arbitraje y Conciliación de la 
 
 217.  See Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 114, 117, 123. 
 218.  See Decree 1818/98, supra note 36; Law No. 270/96, supra note 86, art. 13; Law No. 315/96, 
supra note 35, art. 4. 
 219.  See Panama Convention, supra note 20, art. 3; Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 2 (making 
international arbitration subject to all conventions ratified by Colombia); L. 44/86, septiembre 19, 1986, 
D.O. (Colom.), available in Spanish at Juriscol, http://juriscol.banrep.gov.co (search for 44 under 
“Leyes) (giving domestic application to the Panama Convention) [hereinafter Law No. 44/86]; IACAC 
Arbitration Rules, supra note 65; see also Anderra Energy Corp. v. SAPET Dev. Corp., XXII Y.B. 
COM. ARB. 1077, 1085 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (ordering arbitration pursuant to the IACAC Arbitration Rules 
in absence of party agreement to the contrary); Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 3. This outcome 
could arguably apply even in cases involving state contracts, since the Panama Convention applies 
equally to state and private parties. See Panama Convention, supra note 20. However, the discretionary 
language in Article 4 of Law No. 315/96 could be construed as requiring the parties to a state contract 
to indicate specifically that a dispute is to be resolved by recourse to international arbitration, even 
though parties normally do not need to indicate that their arbitration is international to have the 
international provisions apply. See Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, arts. 1, 4 (stating “it can be agreed” 
that state contracts be subject to international arbitration); supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
Obviously the better practice is to state explicitly in the arbitration agreement what procedures are to 
control. 
 220.  See IACAC Arbitration Rules, supra note 65; see also Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 
21 (regarding challenges to arbitrator). 
 221.  See Hamilton, supra note 30, at 1119; Luis M. Martinez, Are We There Yet?, in ARBITRATION 
REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS (2009). 
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Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá acts as the Colombian national chapter of 
IACAC.222 
Although the IACAC Arbitration Rules cover a broad range of issues, 
they also give the arbitral tribunal a great deal of discretion to decide 
procedural matters, an approach that is consistent with that found in other 
arbitral rules of procedure.223 This exercise of discretion is usually 
exercised in consultation with the parties, as a matter of practice.224 
Because domestic arbitration in Colombia tends to be relatively formal, 
U.S. parties should therefore be prepared for Colombian parties and 
arbitrators to suggest more, rather than less, formal procedures, in 
accordance with domestic norms.225 Furthermore, Colombian parties will 
likely request one or more oral hearings, again based on expectations 
derived from domestic practice, which typically involve multiple hearings, 
including a preliminary hearing, a number of procedural (de trámite) 
hearings and the final “award” hearing (de fallo), where the award is 
rendered and read aloud.226 
One other preliminary point merits mention. There is increased 
interest in the international legal community in adopting multi-tiered (step) 
dispute resolution clauses in cross-border contracts.227 U.S. parties should 
be aware that Colombian courts have held multi-tiered arbitration 
agreements to be unconstitutional in the international context, since “any 
requirements—such as a prior direct resolution mechanism or a prior 
conciliation procedure established by the parties as a step prior to 
arbitration—limited the access of the parties to the administration of 
justice.”228 This may appear somewhat anomalous, since parties to a “legal” 
 
 222.  The Centro de Arbitraje y Conciliación de la Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá also acts as an 
independent arbitral institution outside the context of the IACAC. Other Colombian arbitral institutions 
include the Centro de Conciliación y Arbitraje de la Cámara de Comercio de Barranquilla; the Centro 
de Conciliación, Arbitraje y Amigable Composición de la Cámara de Comercio de Medellín; the 
Cámara de Comercio de Bucaramanga; Cámara de Comercio de Cali; and the Cámara de Comercio de 
Cartagena. 
 223.  See IACAC Arbitration Rules, supra note 65, art. 12(1); LEW ET AL., supra note 15, paras. 
21-12 to 21-13. 
 224.  See LEW ET AL., supra note 15, paras. 8-35, 21-13, 21-36. 
 225.  See Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 114. 
 226.  See id. at 124 (noting that parties may or may not participate in de trámite hearings, other than 
at the first such hearing or at any hearing involving evidentiary matters). 
 227.  See BORN (ICA), supra note 15, at 241. 
 228.  Eduardo Zuleta Jaramillo, Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones - Telecom - En 
Liquidación v. IBM de Colombia S.A. (International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber 
of Commerce, Nov. 17, 2004), KLUWERARBITRATION (Nov. 17, 2004), http://www.kluwer 
arbitration.com (citing Article 229 of the Colombia Constitution). The extraneous provision was not 
fatal to the arbitration, however, since the tribunal simply struck the requirement for conciliation prior 
to arbitration and assumed jurisdiction over the dispute in arbitration. See id. 
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arbitration in a domestic dispute are required to attempt conciliation of the 
dispute prior to entering into the arbitration.229 Nevertheless, U.S. parties 
should avoid the use of multi-tiered dispute resolution clauses in arbitration 
agreements with Colombian nationals. 
Having set forth the basic context for domestic arbitration in 
Colombia, it is time to consider specific provisions. The discussion will 
begin with the arbitration agreement itself. 
1. Arbitration Agreement 
Because Law No. 315/96 does not indicate what constitutes an 
arbitration agreement in an international dispute, parties must look to 
domestic law for guidance.230 Decree 1818/98 specifically states that 
arbitration agreements may be evidenced both by an arbitration clause 
embedded in a larger contract drafted prior to the existence of a legal 
dispute (cláusula compromisoria) as well as by a stand-alone agreement 
made after a specific dispute has already arisen (compromiso).231 The two 
types of agreements are construed in a similar fashion.232 Furthermore, 
arbitration clauses that are found within a larger contract (cláusulas 
compromisorias) are considered legally separable from the underlying 
substantive contract, such that the validity or existence of the latter does not 
affect the validity or existence of the agreement to arbitration.233 
These concepts should sound familiar to U.S. parties, since the United 
States takes a similar view of arbitration agreements, both with respect to 
the validity of agreements to arbitrate made either before or after the 
dispute has arisen, and with respect to the concept of separability.234 
Furthermore, this approach is consistent with the provisions of the Panama 
Convention, which states that agreements to arbitrate are enforceable 
regardless of whether they are made before or after the dispute arises.235 
 
 229.  See Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 119 (citing Decree 2651/91 and Law No. 446/98). 
 230.  See Decree 1818/98, supra note 36; Law No. 315/96, supra note 35. 
 231.  See Decree 1818/98, supra note 36, art. 117; see also Decree 2279/89, supra note 82, art. 2; 
Law No. 446/98, supra note 86, arts. 115-17; Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 114; Zuleta, 2010, 
supra note 13, at 9. Decree 1818/98 uses the single phrase, “pacto arbitral,” to refer to both kinds of 
agreements. See Decree 1818/98, supra note 36, art. 117; see also Decree 2279/89, supra note 82, art. 
2; Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 114. 
 232.  See Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 115. 
 233.  See Decree 1818/98, supra note 36, art. 118; see also Decree 2279/89, supra note 82, art. 2A; 
Law No. 446/98, supra note 86, art. 116; Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 115-16; Zuleta, 2010, supra 
note 13, at 13 (stating principle of separability exists in domestic and international arbitration). 
 234.  See Buckeye Check Cashing Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-46 (2006); Prima Paint 
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 400, 402-04 (1967). 
 235.  See Panama Convention, supra note 20, art. 1. 
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However, Colombia is somewhat different than the U.S. with respect 
to requirements regarding the form of the arbitration agreement. Whereas 
the FAA simply requires a “written provision” indicating an agreement to 
arbitrate, Decree 1818/98 describes the arbitration agreement through use 
of a term (documento) that is defined very broadly in the Code of Civil 
Procedure and includes “writings, printed papers, plans, drawings, tables, 
photographs, cinematographic films, disks, tape recordings, radiographs, 
vouchers, stamps, coupons, labels, seals and, generally any movable object 
which has a representative or declaratory nature, including inscriptions on 
tombstones, monuments, edifices and the like.”236 
Although Law No. 315/96 does not use the term “documento,” it does 
use the same term—”pacto arbitral”—that Decree 1818/98 uses to refer to 
both arbitration agreements and arbitral clauses.237 Therefore, it is likely 
that Colombian courts will adopt Decree 1818/98’s broad description of a 
document that can reflect an “arbitration agreement” in international 
disputes.238 
In some ways, Colombia’s incorporation of the broad definition of a 
“documento” could create problems, since the Panama Convention refers to 
arbitration agreements in significantly narrower terms.239 However, 
international standards on this issue are currently in a state of flux, with 
numerous states reflecting an increasingly liberal approach towards 
requirements regarding the form of the arbitration agreement.240 
 
 236.  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 82, art. 251, as translated in part in 
Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 117; see also Decree 1818/98, supra note 36, arts. 118-19; Decree 
2279/89, supra note 82, arts. 2A, 3.  The precise definition of an “agreement in writing” in international 
commercial arbitration is currently under debate in the United States, with some circuits defining the 
term solely by reference to the FAA, some circuits defining the term by reference to the New York 
Convention, and some circuits attempting to blend the two standards. See New York Convention, supra 
note 19, art. II(2); 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 202; Strong, Writing, supra note 128.  Additional splits exist regarding 
the question of whether a signature is required. See Strong, Writing, supra note 128. Although U.S. 
courts tend to take a relatively liberal view of what constitutes a “letter or telegram” under the New 
York Convention’s writing requirement, it is unclear whether they would go as far as Colombian courts. 
See Ahcom, Inc. v. Smeding, No. C-07-1139 SC, 2008 WL 1701731, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2008); 
Chloe Z. Fishing Co. Inc. v. Odyssey Re (London) Ltd., 109 F.Supp.2d 1236, 1250 (S.D. Cal. 2000); 
Sen Mar, Inc. v. Tiger Petroleum Group, 774 F.Supp. 879, 882-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 237.  See Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 1; Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 6. 
 238.  See Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 82, art. 251; Decree 1818/98, supra note 36, arts. 
117-19. 
 239.  See Panama Convention, supra note 20, art. 1 (stating that “[t]he agreement shall be set forth 
in an instrument signed by the parties, or in the form of an exchange of letters, telegrams, or telex 
communications”); see also Bowman, supra note 52, at 47-48. 
 240.  See Note by the Secretariat, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL), Working Group II (Arbitration), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.139 (Dec. 14, 2005) 
paras. 11-23; Strong, Writing, supra note 128, at 34-37 (discussing New York Convention). Detailed 
discussion of issues involving form requirements is beyond the scope of this Article, although further 
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Furthermore, the United States is one of the jurisdictions that tends to be 
more flexible with respect to form requirements, which should minimize 
the potential for difficulties in disputes involving U.S. and Colombian 
parties.241 
For a while, it was unclear whether and to what extent Colombian 
courts would allow an arbitration agreement to be established in cases 
where the arbitration provision was included in a separate document and 
merely incorporated by reference.242 However, in 2010 the Council of State 
held that an arbitration provision contained in a conditions list was 
sufficient to support arbitration.243 U.S. courts typically allow arbitration 
agreements to arise in these circumstances, so long as the documents that 
are actually exchanged are sufficiently clear as to put the receiving party on 
notice that arbitration has been proposed.244 
2. Arbitral Tribunals and Arbitral Procedure 
Most of Decree 1818/98’s provisions regarding arbitral tribunals and 
procedures are unlikely to influence international proceedings, both 
because Law No. 315/96 gives parties to international disputes the ability 
to choose their own procedures245 and because the IACAC Arbitration 
Rules will apply by default if the parties fail to reach agreement on any 
particular point.246 As a result, Decree 1818/98 has very few gaps to fill in 
this regard as a matter of law. 
However, arbitration is as much about discretionary practices as it is 
about legal requirements, since tribunals typically strive to tailor the 
procedures to suit the needs of the parties and the dispute at hand.247 As 
such, it is important to know the customary practices of everyone involved 
in the arbitral process, including parties, counsel and arbitrators, since those 
 
reading is available. See Report of the Secretary General, United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Working Group II (Arbitration), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.108/Add.1 
(Jan. 26, 2000) para. 8; see generally Strong, Writing, supra note 128. 
 241.  See generally Strong, Writing, supra note 128. 
 242.  See Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 117 (writing in 2002). 
 243.  See Eduardo Zuleta Jaramillo, Consorcio L&A v. Instituto de Desarrollo Urbano [IDU], 
KLUWERARBITRATION (July 19, 2010), http://www.kluwerarbitration.com. 
 244.  See Standard Bent Glass Corp. v. Glassrobots Oy, 333 F.3d 440, 449-50 (3d Cir. 2003); 
Bothell v. Hitachi Zosen Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1053 (W.D. Wash. 2000); Polychronakis v. 
Celebrity Cruises, Inc., No. 08-21806-CV, 2008 WL 5191104, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2008). 
 245.  See Law No. 315/96, supra note 35, art. 2. 
 246.  See Panama Convention, supra note 20, art. 3. 
 247.  See LEW ET AL., supra note 15, paras. 21-12 to 21-13. 
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norms may find their way into an international arbitration, consciously or 
unconsciously.248 
There are a number of things that U.S. parties may find helpful to 
know before entering into an arbitration in Colombia or with a Colombian 
party. First among these is that arbitrators in Colombia often have the 
powers comparable to those of judges, and in fact are considered the legal 
equivalent of a judge in many regards.249 This has both benefits and 
drawbacks. On the one hand, Decree 1818/98 gives robust effect to the 
concept of competence-competence (Kompetenz-Kompetenz), consistent 
with the approach taken in many jurisdictions.250 However, Colombian law 
takes the concept a step further, not only allowing arbitrators to consider 
their own jurisdiction but requiring them to do so as a preliminary matter in 
every domestic proceeding, regardless of whether the parties themselves 
have raised the issue.251 
Most state laws and arbitral rules also embrace the concept of 
competence-competence, so there are no problems with this approach as a 
matter of international law and practice.252 This is true even in situations 
where the parties have not expressly addressed jurisdictional issues, since 
the IACAC Arbitration Rules state that “[i]n general, the arbitral tribunal 
should rule on a plea concerning its jurisdiction as a preliminary question,” 
a position that is entirely consistent with Colombian practice.253 However, 
the arbitral tribunal in an IACAC proceeding is not required to determine 
jurisdictional issues as a preliminary issue and may instead “proceed with 
the arbitration and rule on such a plea in its final award.”254 
This could cause a problem in an arbitration involving a Colombian 
national. Not only do Colombian parties expect to receive an early 
determination on jurisdiction, but they can force tribunals to provide such 
 
 248.  See S.I. Strong, Research in International Commercial Arbitration: Special Skills, Special 
Sources, 20 AM. REV. INT’L ARB., 119, 121, 145-47 (2009). 
 249.  See Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 121. 
 250.  See id.; see also LEW ET AL., supra note 15, paras. 14-13 to 14-18 (describing concept of 
competence-competence). One commentator has noted that “there is no reported international 
arbitration case where the principle [of competence-competence] has not been followed by the courts.” 
See Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 27. 
 251.  See Decree 1818/98, supra note 36, art. 147(2); see also Law 446/98, supra note 86, art. 124; 
Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 121. 
 252.  See LEW ET AL., supra note 15, paras. 14-13 to 14-18; IACAC Arbitration Rules, supra note 
65, art. 18(1). 
 253.  IACAC Arbitration Rules, supra note 65, art. 18(4). 
 254.  Id.; see also Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 36 (noting in international arbitration, a 
jurisdictional objection may be raised at any time). 
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answers through use of a procedure known as an acción de tutela.255 Tutela 
actions will be discussed in more detail below, but it should be mentioned 
here that an acción de tutela has been brought in the pre-arbitration stage 
on at least one occasion.256 In that case, the moving party was able to argue 
successfully that the party’s fundamental right to due process was violated 
by being forced to proceed through arbitration while a jurisdictional 
objection was pending.257 In so deciding, the Constitutional Court stated 
that: 
 
[t]he legal and procedural importance of the pre‐arbitral phase is 
undeniable: although it does not settle the dispute, it shows that a public 
function is being carried out according to a legal procedure which is 
binding both on the institution and on the parties. Although the dispute is 
not decided in this phase, due process and right of defense may be 
compromised if the legal principles governing this phase are violated.258 
 
Therefore, U.S. parties should be aware that Colombian tribunals will 
and likely should address jurisdictional issues as a preliminary matter, so as 
to avoid any interim judicial disputes. In many ways, this is an interesting 
outcome given that preliminary awards on jurisdiction rendered by a 
tribunal in an international arbitration are not enforceable in Colombia, 
since they do not settle the merits of the dispute.259 
The decision on enforceability of preliminary awards was rendered by 
the Supreme Court of Justice, which set down the following rule of 
 
 255.  An acción de tutela can be brought as an interim measure to provide irreversible harm to a 
fundamental right. See Colombia Constitution, supra note 39, art. 86; see also infra notes 347-87 and 
accompanying text. 
 256.  See 18 August 1999 - Corte Constitucional,  26 Y.B. COM. ARB. 260, 260-62, paras. 19-26 at 
266-67 (Albert van den Berg ed.), available at www.kluwerarbitration.com (summarizing and 
excerpting  Merck & Co. Inc. v. Centro de Arbitraje y Conciliación de la Cámara de Comercio de 
Bogotá, Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 18, 1999, Sentencia T-186814) 
[hereinafter Corte Constitucional, Aug. 18, 1999]; Eduardo Zuleta Jaramillo, Special Constitutional 
Action to Preserve International Arbitration, 18 J. INT’L ARB. 475, 476-77 (2001); see generally Zuleta, 
2010, supra note 13, at 63-64. 
 257.  See Colombia Constitution, supra note 39, art. 29 (stating, in part, that “[d]ue process will be 
applied in all cases of legal and administrative measures”); Corte Constitucional, Aug. 18, 1999, supra 
note 256, paras. 19-26 at 267. 
 258.  Corte Constitucional, Aug. 18, 1999, supra note 256, para. 10 at 265. 
 259.  This proposition was settled in a second opinion arising out of the same dispute that generated 
the pre-arbitration tutela action. See 26 January 1999 and 1 March 1999 - Corte Suprema de Justicia 
[Supreme Court], 26 Y.B. COM. ARB. 755, paras. 10, 12-13, at 759-760 (Albert van den Berg ed.) 
(excerpting Merck & Co. Inc. v. Tecnoquímicas S.A., Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme 
Court], enero 26 y marzo 1, 1999). 
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construction for cases involving jurisdictional as well as other preliminary 
awards: 
 
as the Convention does not define what it means by “arbitral awards”, 
this term should be given the meaning which best agrees with the spirit 
of the Convention and, subsidiarily, of Colombian law. . . . according to 
this latter, “arbitral awards” are the arbitral decisions which materially 
end arbitration by settling the submitted disputes.260 
 
Furthermore: 
 
[e]ven if it is formally defined an “arbitral award”, because it calls itself 
so or because it is so called by arbitration rules, still, according to Art. 
I(1) of the Convention, such a decision is not a foreign arbitral award 
enforceable in Colombia, since, independent of how it is called in the 
country of origin, it is simply a preliminary and preparatory interim 
decision, that is, it does not settle the dispute on the merits submitted to 
arbitration, which is the subject matter of a further decision.261 
 
Interestingly, when U.S. courts consider whether an award should be 
considered final, they also look past the nomenclature of the decision and 
focus on the substance of the award.262 However, the ultimate issue for U.S. 
courts is slightly different than that enunciated by Colombian courts. In the 
United States, courts focus not only on whether the award itself is final (as 
Colombian courts do) but also on additional criteria such as whether 
immediate enforcement is necessary to protect the final award and whether 
the parties have expressed an interest in immediate resolution of this 
particular issue.263 
Preliminary determinations as to jurisdiction have their drawbacks in 
Colombia, at least in the domestic realm. For example, a declaration by a 
tribunal that it lacks jurisdiction can result in the total loss of any fees 
otherwise payable to the arbitrator.264 This obviously gives the arbitral 
tribunal significant incentive to find that jurisdiction exists. Although it is 
unclear whether and to what extent this practice extends to arbitrators 
acting in international disputes, proceedings following the IACAC 
Arbitration Rules may benefit from provisions regarding the use of 
 
 260.  Id. para. 10 at 759-60. 
 261.  Id. para. 13 at 760. 
 262.  See Publicis Commc’ns v. True N. Commc’ns, Inc., 206 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 263.  See Hall Steel Co. v. Metalloyd Ltd., 492 F. Supp. 2d 715, 717-20 (E.D. Mich. 2007). 
 264.  See Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 122; see also Decree 1818/98, supra note 36, arts. 145, 
147; Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 18-19. 
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deposits, since the arbitrators’ fees will have been paid in advance, at least 
in part.265 However, arbitrators in international disputes would be well 
advised to consider this matter at the time of appointment and perhaps 
address the matter specifically in a retention agreement between the 
arbitrators and the parties. 
A negative decision on jurisdiction has other unusual ramifications in 
Colombia. For example, a determination that jurisdiction does not exist 
means that the arbitration agreement ceases to have effect.266 The automatic 
termination of the arbitration agreement does not depend on the reason why 
jurisdiction was found not to exist, meaning that there is no requirement 
that the decision denying jurisdiction be based on some inherent attribute of 
the arbitration agreement rather than a curable procedural error, such as 
lack of notice.267 
This approach is highly problematic, since it violates the parties’ 
express desire to arbitrate their disputes268 and can create an opportunity for 
wrongdoers to initiate an improper arbitration with the sole purpose of 
invalidating the arbitration agreement. The situation is further exacerbated 
by the fact that parties facing a negative determination on jurisdiction have 
few tactical options under Colombian law, given that Colombian courts 
have no power to address such matters and are only given the ability to 
annul an arbitral award.269 Decisions denying jurisdiction may only be 
submitted for reconsideration by the tribunal.270 However, given that 
Colombian law recognizes both pre- and post-dispute arbitration 
agreements, parties who truly wish to have the matter heard privately can 
simply enter into another arbitration agreement.271 
Once the arbitration is underway, Decree 1818/98 gives arbitrators 
broad powers to control the proceedings, including the ability to order 
interim relief, even without the assistance of the court.272 This approach is 
 
 265.  See IACAC’s Internal Administrative Procedures for Cases Administered Under Its Rules, 
Procedures 6.3, 6.4.2, IACAC Arbitration Rules, supra note 65. 
 266.  See Decree 1818/98, supra note 36, art. 147 (stating “[i]f the tribunal holds that it lacks 
jurisdiction, the arbitration agreement shall cease to have effect in a final manner”); Law No. 446/98, 
supra note 86, art. 124; Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 122; Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 13-14 
(claiming the “‘effects of the arbitration clause shall be extinguished’ with respect to the matter 
submitted to arbitration”). 
 267.  See Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 122. 
 268.  See id. 
 269.  See id. 
 270.  See Decree 1818/98, supra note 36, art. 147(2); Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 122. 
 271.  See supra note 230 and accompanying text. Of course, it is often difficult to reach agreement 
on procedural issues after a dispute has arisen. See LEW ET AL., supra note 15, para. 6-5. 
 272.  See Decree 1818/98, supra note 36, art. 152; see also Decree 2279/89, supra note 82, art. 
31(2); Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 122; Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 30 (noting lack of 
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consistent with the provisions of both the IACAC Arbitration Rules and the 
procedural rules of many international arbitral institutions.273 In domestic 
arbitrations, the tribunal decides all issues relating to the production and 
presentation of evidence, and can even allow cross-examination of 
witnesses.274 The tribunal’s powers are supplemented by that of the 
Colombian courts, which have the ability to order the production of 
documents at the request of a party or ex officio, based on Article 179 of 
the Colombian Code of Civil Procedure.275 
This latter provision is somewhat unusual, in that few countries allow 
parties to arbitration to make document production requests directly to a 
judge.276 However, the United States is one of the few other jurisdictions in 
the world where a judge can grant party-initiated requests for the 
production of documents in arbitration, although U.S. courts only do so in 
exceptional circumstances.277 Therefore, U.S. parties should not find the 
Colombian approach inherently problematic. Similarly, U.S. parties will 
not find the use of cross-examination in arbitration troubling, although they 
should be prepared for Colombian counsel to have more advanced skills in 
this regard than lawyers from most other civil law jurisdictions.278 
U.S. parties should also be prepared for Colombian parties and 
arbitrators to adopt a high degree of formality with respect to the admission 
of evidence, based on provisions in Decree 1818/98 that analogize the 
admission of evidence in arbitration to procedures used in Colombian 
courts.279 Hearsay evidence is explicitly allowed under Decree 1818/98, 
although the statute outlines in detail how such evidence is to be introduced 
 
similar provision in international arbitrations).  Somewhat unusually, the arbitral tribunal may even call 
on the police to assist with enforcement of arbitral orders. See Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 122; 
Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 25. 
 273.  See IACAC Arbitration Rules, supra note 65, art. 23; Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 29. 
 274.  Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 122; Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 24-25; Zuleta, 
Colombia, supra note 28, paras. 26, 32 (noting international arbitrators will typically respect the parties’ 
agreement on production of documents). 
 275.  See Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 82, art. 179; see also Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 
28, para. 31 (regarding production of evidence from a third party). 
 276.  See BORN (ICA), supra note 15, at 1930. 
 277.  See id. 
 278.  States following the civil law tradition typically do not permit cross-examination in judicial 
actions, and it is unusual for such procedures to be available in domestic arbitration in a civil law 
jurisdiction. However, cross-examination is often used in international commercial arbitration, which 
blends practices used in both the common and civil law. See LEW ET AL., supra note 15, paras. 8-35 to 
8-36, 21-35. 
 279.  See Decree 1818/98, supra note 36, arts. 155-57; Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 124. 
Nevertheless, Colombian law does not require international arbitrations to follow judicial rules of 
evidence applicable in Colombian courts. See Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 25. 
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and handled.280 Notably, use of hearsay is not improper under the IACAC 
Arbitration Rules, since the arbitral tribunal has a great deal of discretion in 
how evidence is to be presented,281 nor is hearsay prohibited in U.S. arbitral 
practice.282 
Domestic arbitration law in Colombia gives arbitrators the ability to 
fill gaps and modify the parties’ agreement as a matter of both substance 
and procedure.283 For example, Decree 1818/98 allows arbitrators to set the 
place of arbitration if the parties have not done so, a practice that is 
consistent with the IACAC Arbitration Rules and U.S. law.284 Colombian 
law also states that domestic tribunals may modify the substance of the 
contract in cases of hardship, even if the parties have not given the tribunal 
the power to act as amiable compositeurs.285 Because this provision is 
found in the Commercial Code rather than Decree 1818/98, it may arguably 
apply to an international arbitration if the merits of the dispute are 
governed by Colombian law.286 Nevertheless, arguments can be made that 
it should not be given effect in international disputes, particularly those 
governed by procedures such as the IACAC Arbitration Rules that state 
that arbitrators may only act as amiable compositeurs if the parties have 
agreed to grant the tribunal such powers.287 
Although Colombian arbitrators have broad powers, they are also 
expected to fulfill their arbitral duties with the utmost diligence, consistent 
with their quasi-judicial status.288 Thus, arbitrators in both national and 
international arbitrations may be subject to the same standards of 
impartiality and independence as a judge.289 Furthermore, Decree 1818/98 
 
 280.  See Decree 1818/98, supra note 36, art. 156. Interestingly, the Colombian approach is similar 
to methods proposed for use in international arbitration. See S.I. Strong & James J. Dries, Witness 
Statements Under the IBA Rules of Evidence: What to Do About Hearsay? 21 ARB. INT’L 301, 308-15 
(2005). 
 281.  See IACAC Arbitration Rules, supra note 65, arts. 12, 21-22. 
 282.  See D.E.I., Inc. v. Ohio, 155 F. App’x. 164, 170 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 283.  See Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 12 (noting this power normally must be expressly 
authorized). 
 284.  Decree 1818/98, supra note 36, art. 132; see also Decree 2279/89, supra note 82, art. 11 
(allowing the same).  See IACAC Arbitration Rules, supra note 65, art. 13; Mantilla-Serrano, supra 
note 5, at 123; see also Capitol Converting Co. v. Curioni, No. 87 C 10439, 1989 WL 152832 (N.D. Ill. 
Nov. 9, 1989). 
 285.  See Commercial Code, supra note 82, art. 868; Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 123. 
 286.  See Commercial Code, supra note 82, art. 868; Decree 1818/98, supra note 36. 
 287.  See IACAC Arbitration Rules, supra note 65, art. 30(b) (noting also that the law applicable to 
the arbitration agreement must permit the tribunal to act as an amiable compositeur, a situation that 
would exist in Colombia); LEW ET AL., supra note 15, paras. 18-86 to 18-96. 
 288.  See Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 121. 
 289.  See Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 20. 
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allows courts to sanction arbitrators for any default (such as might occur 
for lack of diligence in moving the proceeding along), with penalties 
including the reduction or complete withdrawal of any fees payable to the 
arbitrator.290 Arbitrators can also find their fees reduced in cases where an 
award is annulled for reasons associated with arbitrator error.291 Although it 
has been suggested that rules regarding fee reduction will not apply in 
international arbitrations, since arbitrators in those situations are “not . . . 
considered to exercise the jurisdictional power of the State and therefore it 
would not be possible to treat them as if they were judges,” this is 
nevertheless a matter that parties and arbitrators should keep in mind, since 
the question does not yet appear to have been addressed by a court.292 
Arbitrators in international disputes do not need to be Colombian 
nationals.293 However, there may be some disparity between the law on the 
books and what actually happens in practice, to the extent that one of the 
nation’s leading arbitral institutions—the Centro de Arbitraje y 
Conciliación de la Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá, which also happens to 
be the national office for the IACAC—names arbitrators from a list made 
up entirely of Colombian nationals.294 However, this may relate to 
requirements that arbitrators be qualified to practice in Colombia if they are 
deciding a dispute as a matter of Colombian law.295 There is no requirement 
under the IACAC Arbitration Rules that arbitrators be of a particular 
nationality.296 To the contrary, the IACAC Arbitration Rules state that the 
appointing entity may “take into account the advisability of appointing an 
arbitrator of a nationality other than the nationalities of the parties.”297 
3. Post-arbitration Proceedings 
Once the arbitration has concluded, parties have very limited recourse 
to the Colombian courts under Decree 1818/98 and can only seek 
annulment of the award (vacatur), revision of the award or correction of an 
 
 290.  Decree 1818/98, supra note 36, art. 165; see also Decree 2279/89, supra note 82, arts. 18, 34, 
40(4), 44(2) (allowing the same); Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 121; Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 
18-19 (outlining types of misbehavior). 
 291.  See Decree 1818/98, supra note 36, art. 165; Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 121. 
 292.  Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 20-21. 
 293.  See Panama Convention, supra note 20, art. 2 (incorporated into domestic law via Law No. 
44/86); Decree 1818/98, supra note 36, art. 197 (reflecting Article 2 of Law No. 315/96); Law No. 
315/96, supra note 35, art. 2. Provisions requiring arbitrators in domestic disputes to be Colombian 
citizens have also been repealed. See Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 120; Zuleta, Colombia, supra 
note 28, para. 17. 
 294.  See INST. FOR TRANSNAT’L ARB, supra note 18, at 23. 
 295.  See Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 14. 
 296.  See IACAC Arbitration Rules, supra note 65, art. 5. 
 297.  Id. art. 5(7). 
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award.298 These types of post-arbitration procedures are equally applicable 
to domestic disputes and international disputes seated in Colombia.299 
Parties may also bring an acción de tutela, which is a special action seeking 
the protection of a fundamental right.300 Although tutela actions are meant 
to be extraordinary constitutional remedies, they have been brought with 
increasing frequency in arbitration, although “there is no reported 
international arbitration case where it was successfully used in such [a] 
way.”301 Tutelas are discussed separately in Section II.C.4 below.302 
Traditionally, parties in Colombia could not waive their right to 
annulment, correction or revision proceedings.303 However, a Superior 
Tribunal decision from 2010 put the common understanding regarding 
waiver of annulment proceedings into doubt.304 Parties to an international 
dispute may waive or amend their right to correction under Decree 1818/98 
if the procedural rules applicable to the arbitration address correction.305 
 
 298.  See Decree 1818/98, supra note 36, arts. 160-61; Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 128-30; 
Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 37 (including translations of the provisions regarding the 
grounds for annulment and revision of the award). 
 299.  See Gomm-Santos, supra note 28, at 15 (discussing annulment proceedings in SAP Andina y 
del Caribe C.A. Colombia v. Colombia and noting the Superior Tribunal relied on Article 161 of Decree 
1818/98); Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 37 (citing Empresa Colombiana de Vías Férreas 
(Ferrovías) v. Drummond Ltd., No. 25.25, Consejo de Estado, Oct. 24, 2003); Zuleta, 2010, supra note 
13, at 56-57. But see Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 39 (suggesting parties to international arbitration 
may contract around Decree 1818/98’s provisions regarding the correction of awards). Although Decree 
1818/98 “theoretically unified the legislation pertaining to the annulment of arbitration decisions for 
private parties and private vs. State entities[, i]n reality this unification took place with Law 1150 of 
2007, which amended the regime of State contracts in Colombia.”  U.S. EMBASSY, supra note 9, at 6. 
 300.  See generally Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 37 (citing article 86 of the Colombian 
Constitution and Decree 2591/91); see also Colombia Constitution, supra note 39, art. 86 (setting forth 
constitutional basis for an acción de tutela); infra notes 347-87 and accompanying text. 
 301.  Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 38; see also Arango & Parra, supra note 13, at 57 
(noting “[o]ne of the current issues affecting arbitration is the challenge of arbitration awards by means 
of constitutional fundamental rights actions (“Tutela”)). 
 302.  See generally infra notes 347-87 and accompanying text. 
 303.  See Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 128 (stating in 2002 that waiver is not allowed); Zuleta, 
2010, supra note 13, at 58-60 (suggesting waiver is not typically possible). 
 304.  See Gomm-Santos, supra note 28, at 14-15 (suggesting in 2010 that waiver may be possible 
under the Superior Tribunal’s decision in SAP Andina y del Caribe C.A. v. Unknown, May 21, 2010); 
Eduardo Zuleta Jaramillo, SAP Andina y del Caribe C.A. Colombia v. Unknown, Superior Tribunal of 
Bogotá, KLUWERARBITRATION (May 21, 2010), http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (stating “the mere 
fact of raising an annulment recourse does not deprive [the award] of being a final decision, and 
although the parties enjoy autonomy to tailor the proceedings, they cannot act against due process in 
order to determine whether the proceeding agreed by the parties was fulfilled; thus, the [annulment] 
recourse is [in principle] available”) [hereinafter SAP Andina]; see also Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 
56-59. 
 305.  See Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 39. 
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Requests for correction are similar to those seen in other countries, 
typically focusing on ministerial or administrative errors, such as those 
involving arithmetical miscalculations.306 Requests for revision (recurso 
extraordinario de revisión) are somewhat unique to Colombia and arise in 
cases involving: 
 
(i) fraud in the proceedings (perjury, forgery of documentary evidence or 
collusion); (ii) due process violations (lack of notice of the proceedings 
and lack of proper representation if such irregularities were not 
subsequently cured); (iii) production of new evidence that would have 
modified the outcome of the decision, but was not produced by the 
moving party due to force majeure (Caso Fortuito) or the actions of the 
other party, and (iv) when the decision is null and void and not subject to 
appeal.307 
 
Procedures for annulling an award in Colombia are also similar to 
those seen elsewhere. Courts may only undertake a limited review, with the 
substance of the arbitral award protected from judicial scrutiny.308 The only 
grounds on which annulment may be grounded are, generally speaking, a 
“void or expired agreement, irregular composition of the tribunal, failure 
by the arbitrator to comply with his terms of reference, and breach of due 
process.”309 Colombian courts have also indicated that Decree 1818/98 
constitutes the exclusive ground upon which an award may be set aside.310 
Thus, a claim that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the dispute is not 
grounds for annulling an award, and to grant such annulment would violate 
concepts of due process.311 
Interestingly, Decree 1818/98 does not permit a court to annul an 
arbitral award based on a violation of public policy.312 This provision was 
the subject of an acción de tutela in 2005, with certain parties to a domestic 
 
 306.  See Decree 1818/98, supra note 36, art. 160; see also Decree 2279/89, supra note 82, art. 36; 
Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 129; see also Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 82, arts. 309-12. 
 307.  INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 40, para. 10; see also Code of Civil 
Procedure, supra note 82, arts. 379-80; Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 130 (summarizing grounds 
for recourse as involving “fraud, collusion, duress or corruption on the part of the arbitrators, witnesses, 
or forged documents that were decisive for the award, etc.”). 
 308.  See Decree 1818/98, supra note 36, arts. 161-65; see also Decree 2279/89, supra note 82, 
arts. 37-40; Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 128-29. 
 309.  Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 129; see also Decree 1818/98, supra note 36, art. 163 
(listing nine grounds that are also found in Articles 38 and 39 of Decree 2279/89). 
 310.  See Eduardo Zuleta Jaramillo, Bancolombia v. Bogotá Civil Tribunal, Supreme Court of 
Justice, KLUWERARBITRATION (Mar. 1, 2008), http://www.kluwerarbitration.com. 
 311.  See id. 
 312.  See Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 129. 
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arbitration agreement claiming that their right to equal treatment was being 
violated because participants in international arbitration may rely on public 
policy as grounds for non-enforcement of an award under the New York or 
Panama Convention.313 Ultimately the action failed, with the Constitutional 
Court affirming the constitutional validity of the current approach on the 
grounds that there are sufficient differences between international and 
domestic arbitration to justify the difference in legal treatment.314 
Notably, this limitation on public policy arguments only relates to 
motions to annul under Decree 1818/98.315 Parties may still object to the 
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award under the New York and Panama 
Conventions on the grounds that the award violates Colombian public 
policy.316 However, Colombian courts appear to construe this exception 
very narrowly, based on a 2004 decision from the Supreme Court of Justice 
describing the grounds on which a public policy objection can be raised in 
the enforcement of a foreign judgment as well as a 1996 decision from the 
same court involving the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award.317 
For example, in the 2004 case involving a foreign judgment, the 
Supreme Court of Justice held that “[t]he consideration of domestic public 
policy rules does not imply that every Colombian mandatory law must be 
applied,” since that would “likely result in the annulment of every foreign 
judgment, contradicting the essence of the exequatur process, the purpose 
of which is recognition of a foreign judgment.”318 This is consistent with 
the 1996 decision involving a foreign arbitral award, which also recognized 
that an arbitral award that disregards a mandatory provision of law does not 
necessarily violate public policy.319 This philosophy is also very much in 
 
 313.  See Eduardo Zuleta Jaramillo, Decision C-800/2005, Constitutional Court, 
KLUWERARBITRATION (Aug. 2, 2005), http://www.kluwerarbitration.com [hereinafter Decision C-
800/2005]; see also Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 37. Decision C-800/2005 is also 
summarized in Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 57-58. 
 314.  See Decision C-800/2005, supra note 313. 
 315.  See Decree 1818/98, supra note 36, art. 163. 
 316.  See New York Convention, supra note 19, art. V(2)(b); Panama Convention, supra note 20, 
art. 5(2)(b). 
 317.  See Eduardo Zuleta Jaramillo, Supreme Court of Justice, KLUWERARBITRATION (Aug. 6, 
2004), http://www.kluwerarbitration.com [hereinafter Supreme Court of Justice, Aug. 6, 2004]; Zuleta, 
Colombia, supra note 28, para. 48 (citing unnamed case from the Supreme Court of Justice dated 
November 5, 1996). 
 318.  Supreme Court of Justice, Aug. 6, 2004, supra note 317. 
 319.  See Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 48 (citing unnamed case from the Supreme Court 
of Justice dated November 5, 1996). 
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accord with the pro-enforcement bias reflected in the New York and 
Panama Conventions and in U.S. law.320 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Justice decision from 2004 
recognized that allowing a Colombian court to consider the differences 
between Colombian law and the substantive law under which the judgment 
was made would be equivalent to permitting the Colombian court to review 
the merits of the case, an outcome that the Court criticized and refused to 
permit.321 Instead, the Court held that, rather than comparing foreign law 
and Colombian mandatory law, the enforcing court should compare foreign 
law and fundamental principles of Colombian law as a more general 
matter.322 Again, this view of the public policy exception is consistent with 
views taken by the international arbitral community as well as views 
enunciated by U.S. courts.323 
Finally, the Colombian Supreme Court of Justice indicated in its 2004 
decision that the concept of public policy must be interpreted in an 
international light.324 The Court also stated that enforcing courts should 
consider public policy objections in the context of the needs of a changing 
global economy.325 This echoes rationales enunciated in 1996, when the 
Court stated that non-enforcement of a foreign arbitral award for a violation 
of public policy is only appropriate when the recognition of the award 
affects “indispensable principles that safeguard society, principles 
regarding the essential interests of any country related to the political, 
moral, religious or economical order.”326 This is again very much 
consistent with international legal norms regarding the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards.327 
The issue of annulment versus non-enforcement raises the issue of 
primary and secondary jurisdiction. The international arbitral regime gives 
certain courts—those with primary jurisdiction—the exclusive ability to 
 
 320.  See BORN (ICA), supra note 15, at 2833; Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan 
Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 190 F. Supp. 2d 936, 945 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (discussing 
U.S. recognition of the “pro-enforcement bias” of the New York Convention). 
 321.  See Supreme Court of Justice, Aug. 6, 2004, supra note 317. 
 322.  See id. 
 323.  See BORN (ICA), supra note 15, at 2833; see also Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. 
Societe Generale de l’Industrie du Papier (RATKA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 324.  See Supreme Court of Justice, Aug. 6, 2004, supra note 318. 
 325.  See id. 
 326.  Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 48 (translating an excerpt from an unnamed case from 
the Supreme Court of Justice dated November 5, 1996). 
 327.  See BORN (ICA), supra note 15, at 2833. 
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address various procedural matters associated with the arbitration.328 Courts 
with primary jurisdiction are those located in the place where the award 
was made (i.e., the arbitral seat) or in the place under whose law the award 
was made.329 Courts in all other countries have only “secondary 
jurisdiction,” regardless of whether they have any other preexisting 
connection with the parties, the arbitration or the dispute.330 
Perhaps the most important power associated with primary jurisdiction 
is the ability to annul or vacate an arbitral award.331 Only the court with 
primary jurisdiction (typically the court at the seat of the arbitration) is 
allowed to undertake such an action.332 All other courts (i.e., courts with 
secondary jurisdiction) are only allowed to refuse enforcement of what to 
them is a foreign arbitral award.333 The distinction is important because 
annulment and non-enforcement can involve different standards and 
procedures.334 
The concept of primary and secondary jurisdiction has been adopted 
by both the United States335 and Colombia,336 which means that only a 
court at the arbitral seat has the ability to annul or vacate an arbitral award. 
Therefore, the grounds for annulment reflected in Decree 1818/98 cannot 
be relied upon in cases involving an award rendered outside of 
 
 328.  See id. at 1286, 2337-38. The distinction between primary and secondary jurisdiction 
developed pursuant to language in the New York Convention indicating that a court may refuse to 
enforce an award rendered in another state if the award “has been set aside or suspended by a competent 
authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.” New York 
Convention, supra note 19, art. V(1)(e). 
 329.  See BORN (ICA), supra note 15, at 1286, 2337-38. In virtually all cases, both analyses point to 
the same state. See id. 
 330.  See id. 
 331.  See id. Decree 1818/98 uses the phrase “annulment” to refer to the process of setting aside an 
award in the place where it was made, whereas U.S. jurisprudence generally speaks of “vacating” such 
awards. See Decree 1818/98, supra note 36, art. 160-61; 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006). The three phrases - 
annulment, vacatur and set-aside - all mean the same thing. For ease of analysis, the phrase 
“annulment” will primarily be used in the context of Colombian law and “vacatur” will be used in the 
context of U.S. law. 
 332.  See BORN (ICA), supra note 15, at 1286, 2337-38. 
 333.  See id. 
 334.  The Model Arbitration Law attempts to avoid this dichotomy by establishing standards for 
annulment (i.e., set-aside) that are essentially identical to those for non-enforcement, but neither 
Colombia nor the United States has adopted the Model Arbitration Law. See Model Arbitration Law, 
supra note 22, arts. 34-36. 
 335.  See Karaha Bodas Co., LLC v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 
364 F.3d 274, 287 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 336.  See Empresa Colombiana, Apr. 27, 2004, supra note 177; Empresa Colombiana, Apr. 22, 
2004, supra note 177; Empresa Colombiana, Oct. 24, 2003, supra note 177; U.S. EMBASSY, supra note 
9, at 7; Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 37 (citing Articles 161-62 of Decree 1818/98). 
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Colombia.337 Instead, parties in those cases have to look to the grounds for 
non-enforcement under the New York or Panama Convention.338 As stated 
previously, the two conventions are virtually indistinguishable in this 
regard.339 
Although Colombia is very similar to the United States with respect to 
its substantive approach to correction, revision, annulment and non-
enforcement, U.S. parties may find Colombia’s procedural requirements 
unusual. For example, it has been suggested that a court that orders partial 
annulment of an arbitral award may have the power to correct errors or 
even step into the shoes of the arbitral tribunal and address a substantive 
question if the tribunal failed to rule on a question submitted to 
arbitration.340 However, a court that sets aside an award in its entirety has 
no remaining jurisdiction over the substantive issues and therefore cannot 
exercise these sorts of curative powers.341 Although this provision does not 
appear to apply in an international arbitration, U.S. parties should 
nevertheless be aware of it, since it is always possible that a court could 
take this task upon itself.342 
Decree 1818/98 contemplates other procedures that U.S. parties may 
find unusual. For example, an application to set aside an arbitral award 
must be made to the president of the arbitral tribunal or to the sole 
arbitrator within five days of the notification of the award (which, in the 
case of a de fallo procedure, will be at the final hearing).343 This is an 
important requirement to remember, since submitting the request directly to 
the court will render the request invalid.344 Furthermore, even if the 
annulment proceedings fail, prevailing parties will still have to complete 
exequatur procedures, as discussed above.345 
 
 337.  See Empresa Colombiana, Apr. 27, 2004, supra note 178. 
 338.  See New York Convention, supra note 19, art. V; Panama Convention, supra note 20, art. 5. 
 339.  See New York Convention, supra note 19, art. V; Panama Convention, supra note 20, art. 5; 
supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 340.  See Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 130. Notably, this remedy is adopted only in 
exceptional cases. Id. 
 341.  See id. 
 342.  See Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 40. 
 343.  See Decree 1818/98, supra note 36, art. 161; Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 129; see supra 
note 277 and accompanying text (regarding de fallo procedure). 
 344.  See Gomm-Santos, supra note 28, at 14 (discussing SAP Andina y del Caribe C.A. Colombia 
v. Colombia, lower court decision of 20 Mar. 2010); see also SAP Andina, supra note 304. Ultimately 
the matter will be heard by the court at the seat of the arbitration. See Decree 1818/98, supra note 36, 
art. 166; Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 5, at 129. 
 345.  See supra notes 156-71 and accompanying text. 
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4. Constitutional Issues 
One of the most novel aspects of Colombian arbitration law is the 
extent to which the field has become constitutionalized in recent years.346 
While the form of relief known as an acción de tutela is meant to be used 
as an extraordinary remedy of last resort in cases involving a violation of a 
fundamental right, the device has been used in the arbitral realm with 
considerable frequency in the last five years.347 The action can be used to 
address acts and omissions of either private persons or the state, and 
requires an actual or threatened violation of a fundamental constitutional 
right.348 Although the tutela may be seen as allowing a substantive review 
of the merits of the award, “there is no reported international arbitration 
case where it was successfully used in such [a] way.”349 
Two lines of cases appear to exist in the arbitral realm, one focusing 
on equal treatment and one focusing on party autonomy.350 Although these 
decisions arose in the domestic context, they nevertheless provide 
important information about the way in which Colombian courts consider 
these types of constitutional arguments. As will be seen, Colombian courts 
appear well aware that a broad right to mount a constitutional challenge to 
arbitral procedures could have a potentially devastating effect on 
arbitration. As a result, courts appear hesitant to find a constitutional 
violation and have denied relief in all cases where it has been sought in the 
arbitral context.351 
 
 346.  See Arango & Parra, supra note 13, at 57; Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 38. 
 347.  See Colombia Constitution, supra note 39, art. 86; D. 2591/91 noviembre 29, 1991, D.O. 
(Colom.), available in Spanish at Juriscol, http://juriscol.banrep.gov.co (search for 2591 under 
“Decretos) (outlining procedure) [hereinafter Decree 2591/91]. Fundamental rights are found in Title II, 
Chapter I, of the Colombia Constitution. See Colombia Constitution, supra note 39, arts. 11-41. 
 348.  See Decree 2591/91, supra note 347, art. 2; Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 63-64. Although 
the tutela is commonly referred to as involving only fundamental rights, Article 2 of Decree 2591/91 
suggests that there is room for expansion. See Decree 2591/91, supra note 347, art. 2 (stating that “[t]he 
acción de tutela guarantees fundamental constitutional rights. When a tutela decision refers to a right 
that is not expressly indicated to be a fundamental right under the Constitution, but whose nature 
permits a tutela in specific instances, the Constitutional Court will give it priority consideration in its 
review of that decision”) (author’s translation). However, some limitations on possible tutela rights are 
reflected in Article 4 of Decree 2591/91, which states, “The rights protected by the acción de tutela 
shall be interpreted in conformity with the international human rights treaties ratified by Colombia.” Id. 
art. 4 (author’s translation). 
 349.  Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 38. 
 350.  See Colombia Constitution, supra note 39, arts. 13, 28; see also supra notes 257-62 and 
accompanying text (discussing tutela actions in the context of preliminary awards on jurisdiction). 
 351.  See Zuleta, 2010, supra note 13, at 64. 
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a. Equal Treatment 
One line of analysis involves the right to equal treatment under the 
law.352 The first case in this series, Decision C-800/2005, was introduced in 
the preceding subsection in the context of the discussion about public 
policy being unavailable as grounds for annulment under domestic law.353 
Here, the moving party claimed that the absence of a public policy 
objection in domestic arbitration law violated the right to equal treatment 
because parties to international arbitrations could object to enforcement of 
a foreign award based on violations of Colombian public policy.354 This 
claim, which was decided by the Colombian Constitutional Court in 2005, 
was ultimately unsuccessful on the grounds that the two types of 
arbitration—domestic and international—were sufficiently different to 
support disparate treatment.355 
Although Decision C-800/2005 could be seen by U.S. parties as 
problematic in that it establishes the availability of tutela actions in cases 
involving arbitration and thus expands the number of post-arbitration 
judicial proceedings available in Colombia, the decision can also be viewed 
in a more positive light to the extent that it suggests that the Constitutional 
Court is willing to uphold certain basic differences between international 
and domestic arbitrations.356 As such, Decision C-800/2005 could be seen 
as limiting the number of challenges that might be made to an international 
arbitration because it creates precedent suggesting that international 
arbitration is inherently different than domestic arbitration.357 This is not to 
say that an acción de tutela will never be brought against an international 
arbitration based on an alleged violation of the right of equal treatment, but 
the Constitutional Court does not appear sympathetic to that argument as an 
initial matter. Interestingly, the Colombian Constitutional Court’s view in 
this regard is somewhat reminiscent of statements by the U.S. Supreme 
 
 352.  See Colombia Constitution, supra note 39, art. 13 (stating, in part, “[a]ll individuals are born 
free and equal before the law, will receive equal protection and treatment from the authorities, and will 
enjoy the same rights, freedoms and opportunities without any discrimination on account of gender, 
race, national or family origin, language, religion, political opinion, or philosophy. The State will 
promote the conditions so that equality may be real and effective and will adopt measures in favor of 
groups that are discriminated against or marginalized.”). 
 353.  See supra notes 313-15 and accompanying text. 
 354.  See Eduardo Zuleta Jaramillo, Decision C-800/2005, Constitutional Court, 
KLUWERARBITRATION (Aug. 2, 2005), http://www.kluwerarbitration.com; see also supra notes 313-15 
and accompanying text. 
 355.  See Decision C-800/2005, supra note 314. 
 356.  See id. 
 357.  See id. 
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Court recognizing that there are certain aspects of international arbitration 
that do not exist in domestic arbitration.358 
One other challenge in the arbitral realm has been based on a claim of 
unequal treatment.359 This action arose purely as a matter of domestic law 
in the context of the arbitrability of shareholder agreements.360 The 
company in question was of a special type that was subject to reduced 
regulation, allowing shareholder disputes to be arbitrated.361 The claim was 
made that the constitutional principle of equal treatment was violated 
because shareholders of other types of companies could not subject their 
claims to arbitration and thus were being treated differently than 
shareholders of these sorts of limited-regulation companies.362 In Decision 
C-014/2010, the Constitutional Court ruled that a constitutional violation 
did not occur, since these types of companies were different enough to 
justify different treatment.363 Furthermore, the Court noted that the then-
recent revisions to Article 6 of Law No. 1285/09 reflected a “more flexible 
standard of arbitration” than had been recognized in earlier decisions, thus 
permitting arbitrations in this context.364 Finally, the Court held that party 
consent was respected because arbitration could not proceed without the 
unanimous consent of all shareholders.365 
Decisions C-800/2005 and C-014/2010 are interesting for several 
reasons. On the one hand, they appear to reflect a pro-arbitration policy that 
is consistent with positions taken in the United States and elsewhere.366 
This obviously bodes well for international parties seeking assurance that 
 
 358.  See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985) 
(stating that “concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational 
tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for predictability in the 
resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties’ agreement, even assuming that a contrary 
result would be forthcoming in a domestic context”). 
 359.  See Eduardo Zuleta Jaramillo, Fabián López-Guzmán v. Unknown, Decision C-014/2010, 
Constitutional Court, KLUWERARBITRATION (Jan. 20, 2010), http://www.kluwerarbitration.com 
(claiming violations of due process and access to justice) [hereinafter Decision C-014/2010]. 
 360.  Id. This action does not appear to be an acción de tutela, but instead is a public 
constitutionality action (acción pública de inconstitucionalidad). See id. Nevertheless, the principles 
discussed are useful to the current discussion. 
 361.  See id. (citing L. 1258/08, mayo 12, 2008, D.O. (Colom.)). 
 362.  See id. Interestingly, Germany recently revised its laws to allow shareholder arbitration in 
certain types of corporate disputes, suggesting a trend in civil law jurisdictions. See S.I. Strong, 
Collective Arbitration Under the DIS Supplementary Rules for Corporate Law Disputes: A European 
Form of Class Arbitration?, 29 ASA BULL. 145, 149-64 (2011). 
 363.  See Decision C-014/2010, supra note 360. 
 364.  Id. 
 365.  See id. 
 366.  See id.; Decision C-800/2005, supra note 314; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985). 
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their arbitration agreements will be respected. On the other hand, the 
decisions suggest that challenges regarding the right of equal treatment can 
be interpreted across societal lines in Colombia. This is somewhat 
problematic for international parties, who are more used to seeing concerns 
about equal treatment arise between the actual parties to the arbitration.367 
This is not to say that parties to an international dispute can safely ignore 
issues regarding equal treatment between the parties to the dispute, but 
simply to note that constitutional challenges in Colombia arise in a broader 
context than is usually the case in arbitration. 
b. Party Autonomy 
The second line of constitutional cases involves the principle of party 
autonomy.368 Although the first case to arise in this context, Decision SU-
174/2007, arose in the context of domestic rather than international 
arbitration, it nevertheless laid the foundation for several important legal 
principles that have developed over the last five years.369 
First, Decision SU-174/2007 firmly established that parties not only 
may agree upon the rules applicable to their arbitration without fear of 
violating the Colombian Constitution, but also that arbitral institutions may 
promulgate procedural rules that differ from those reflected in national 
rules of arbitration.370 This approach was subsequently confirmed by 
Decision C-713/2008, which suggested that any abrogation of party 
autonomy, even when effectuated by the legislature, is contrary to the 
Colombian Constitution.371 In this second opinion, the court specifically 
indicated that its decision eliminated the grounds on which the infamous 
 
 367.  See LEW ET AL., supra note 15, paras. 5-69, 16-11 to 16-12, 22-62. 
 368.  See Colombia Constitution, supra note 39, art. 28 (stating, in part, that “[e]very individual is 
free”). 
 369.  See Eduardo Zuleta Jaramillo, Empresa de Teléfonos de Botogá v. Tribunal de Arbitramento 
Telefónica, Decision T-058/2009, Corte Constitucional, KLUWERARBITRATION (Feb. 2, 2009), 
http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (discussing Decision SU-174/2007) [hereinafter Empresa de 
Teléfonos]; Gomm-Santos, supra note 28, at 15; Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 9 (noting 
Decision SU-174/2007 also permits a settlement in situations where it refers to obligations having an 
economic nature). 
 370.  See Gomm-Santos, supra note 28, at 15; see also Empresa de Teléfonos, supra note 370 
(discussing Decision SU-174/2007). 
 371.  See Decision C-713/2008, supra note 98; Gomm-Santos, supra note 28, at 15, 50 (translating 
Decision C-713/2008 as stating that the “party autonomy principle constitutes one of the most important 
characteristics of arbitration; it gives the parties the opportunity to agree (or not) to arbitrate and to 
decide on the applicable rules of procedure to be followed in order to resolve the controversy”); see also 
Morales, supra note 28, at 168. 
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TermoRio case372 was founded, thus eliminating the possibility that such an 
outcome will be repeated in the future.373 
Decision C-713/2008 does not mean that party autonomy in Colombia 
is now absolute, for the court specifically indicated that this principle will 
not be interpreted in such a way as to undermine the regulatory authority of 
the state.374 Instead, party autonomy remains bounded by fundamental 
constitutional rights including those involving due process and procedural 
fairness.375 This approach is entirely consistent with that reflected 
elsewhere in the international arbitral regime.376 
Second, Decision SU-174/2007 was instrumental in delineating the 
criteria that should be used to determine whether an acción de tutela is 
available.377 The court outlined four factors. 
First, Colombian courts are to demonstrate “[r]espect for the 
autonomy of the arbitrators or the arbitral tribunal.”378 This means that “the 
scope of deliberation by the arbitrator cannot be invaded by the 
constitutional judge,” lest the arbitrator’s ability “to render a decision on 
the merits of an issue submitted to arbitration” be impeded.379 
 
 372.  See Uran-Bidegain, supra note 28 (summarizing TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 
F.3d 928, 936 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). TermoRio involved an arbitration that had initially been understood to 
be international in character but that was later determined to be domestic. See id. The arbitration, which 
was seated in Colombia, had proceeded pursuant to the ICC Arbitration Rules and a final award had 
been rendered. See id. However, because Colombian law at that time stated that domestic arbitrations 
could not proceed subject to institutional rules such as those promulgated by the ICC, the award was 
annulled. See Decision C-713/2008, supra note 98 (discussing TermoRio); see also Uran-Bidegain, 
supra note 28. Further controversy arose in the United States when the Circuit Court for the District of 
Columbia refused enforcement on the grounds that the New York Convention required non-
enforcement when an award had been set aside at the place of arbitration, a holding that was out of step 
with previous U.S. precedent indicating that non-enforcement in such circumstances was discretionary 
under the New York Convention. See New York Convention, supra note 19, art. V(1)(e); TermoRio, 
487 F.3d at  936-38; Chromalloy Aeroservs. v. Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907, 911 (D.D.C. 1996) (upholding 
an arbitral award against nullification in Egyptian courts). Both the U.S. and Colombian decisions have 
been criticized. See BORN (ICA), supra note 15, at 2679, 2683-84; Christopher Koch, The Enforcement 
of Awards Annulled at Their Place of Origin, 26 J. INT’L L. 267, 285-90 (2009); Linda Silberman, The 
New York Convention After Fifty Years: Some Reflections on the Role of National Law, 38 GA. J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 25, 34-36 (2009). 
 373.  See Decision C-713/2008, supra note 98 (noting that TermoRio was based on rationales found 
in Decision C-037/1997, which is no longer valid in light of Decision C-713/2008). 
 374.  See Gomm-Santos, supra note 28, at 50. 
 375.  See Decision C-713/2008, supra note 98; Gomm-Santos, supra note 28, at 50. 
 376.  See New York Convention, supra note 19, art. V; Panama Convention, supra note 20, art. 5; 
BORN (ICA), supra note 15, at 1750. 
 377.  See Empresa de Teléfonos, supra note 370 (summarizing criteria under Decision SU-
174/2007); see also Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 37. 
 378.  Empresa de Teléfonos, supra note 370. 
 379.  Id. 
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Second, judges are to consider “[t]he exceptional nature of the writ of 
fundamental rights, which requires that the award in question manifestly 
violates [sic] fundamental rights.”380 Although no known cases elucidate 
the standard to be used for “manifest violation,” the test appears to be 
relatively high. 
Third, courts may only consider an acción de tutela in cases where 
“the writ [is] admissible according to the court’s case-law on the different 
scenarios where the fundamental right to due process could be defaulted on 
by arbitral awards (vías de hecho).”381 A vía de hecho only exists when a 
judge or arbitrator “uses its legal powers for a purpose different to that 
justifying them; has no competence to decide on the subject matter of the 
dispute; deviates from the procedure indicated by law; or makes its 
decision with no evidentiary support.”382 This limits constitutional 
challenges to those involving well-established, fundamental notions of due 
process, which is a standard used elsewhere, including the United States, 
even when challenges to arbitral awards have not been 
constitutionalized.383 
Fourth, “[t]he auxiliary nature of the writ of fundamental rights . . . 
may only be exercised once the ordinary remedies are exhausted (most 
notably the petition to annul the award).”384 Although this provision will 
have the effect of extending the time it takes to confirm or enforce an 
arbitral award in Colombia, it does eliminate the possibility of complex 
constitutional litigation in the first instance. 
These four factors obviously reflect a strong bias in favor of 
arbitration, a perspective that international parties will doubtless welcome. 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court’s reluctance to interfere with arbitral 
awards bodes well for the future of arbitration in Colombia. Unfortunately, 
some of the clarity of Decision SU-174/2007 was lost in 2009 when the 
First Revision Chamber of the Constitutional Court modified this four-part 
 
 380.  Id. 
 381.  Id. 
 382.  Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 37. 
 383.  See Panama Convention, supra note 20, art. 5 (describing grounds for non-enforcement of a 
foreign arbitral award or an award considered by a state to be non-domestic); 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006) 
(allowing vacatur “(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where 
there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators 
were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in 
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by 
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, 
or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter 
submitted was not made”). 
 384.  Empresa de Teléfonos, supra note 370 (summarizing criteria under Decision SU-174/2007). 
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test and replaced it with “a general requirement of a threat or a violation of 
a fundamental right.”385 This of course unsettles the law in this area, 
making it somewhat difficult to predict the scope of review that will be 
necessary in the future for acciones de tutela involving arbitral awards.386 
CONCLUSION 
By all accounts, Colombia has created a legal and economic 
environment that provides a solid, reliable foundation for long-term 
development.387 Commercial actors from the United States and elsewhere 
are looking at Colombia with fresh eyes, seeking investment and business 
opportunities in a country that is poised to establish itself on the world 
stage.388 
Nevertheless, some obstacles remain. One of the more pressing issues 
involves Colombia’s remarkably slow judicial system. This is a problem 
for many international commercial actors, since they will refuse to enter 
into a cross-border transaction if they cannot find a reputable and 
reasonably efficient means of enforcing contractual obligations.389 
Fortunately, litigation is not the only method of resolving international 
commercial disputes, and all three branches of the Colombian 
government—legislative, executive and judicial—appear united in their 
desire to establish a thriving arbitration culture, particularly with respect to 
international disputes.390 
Notably, these efforts are ongoing. Although the last major reform 
measures were undertaken in 1998, when Decree 1818/98 was 
promulgated,391 additional attempts were made in 2001, 2007, 2009 and 
2010.392 Yet another bill was introduced in June 2011.393 This new proposal 
focused specifically on making Colombia a more hospitable place for 
 
 385.  Id.; see also U.S. EMBASSY, supra note 9, at 10 (framing the analysis as “manifest disregard 
of law,” which is a U.S. term of art in arbitration but which appears to be to be an incorrect translation 
of the phrase “vías de hecho”); Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 37 (defining “vías de hecho”). 
 386.  See Empresa de Teléfonos, supra note 370; see also Arango & Parra, supra note 13, at 57. 
 387.  See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text. 
 388.  See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text. 
 389.  See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 390.  The legislature has passed numerous laws liberalizing the arbitral regime, while the executive 
has promulgated several decrees doing the same. See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text. 
Furthermore, the Colombian courts appear to be establishing a strong pro-arbitration policy in both the 
domestic and international realms. See supra notes 347-87 and accompanying text. 
 391.  See Decree 1818/98, supra note 36. 
 392.  See Morales, supra note 28, at 167-68; see also U.S. EMBASSY, supra note 9, at 15-16. 
 393.  See Carter, Improving Recognition, supra note 28; see also Anteproyecto de Ley No. __ - 
2011 Camara, Por medio de la cual se expide el Estatuto de Arbitraje Nacional e Internacional y se dicta 
otras disposiciones (proposed law) (on file with author). 
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international arbitration by significantly reducing the amount of time 
needed to obtain recognition of an award (reportedly allowing a final 
determination within thirty days) and barring any appeal or challenge to the 
decision to recognize the award.394 Although the future of the bill is 
unclear, it is safe to say that arbitration law in Colombia is in a constant 
state of evolution.395 
Nevertheless, there are some existing elements of Colombian 
arbitration law that can cause concern in the United States. For example, 
not only does enforcement of an arbitral award take a significant amount of 
time (although this period is far shorter than would be the case if the 
dispute was litigated), but parties to Colombian disputes run the risk of 
facing an acción de tutela. However, Colombian courts appear inclined to 
limit the availability of this type of action in arbitration, and the situation is 
bound to improve as judicial precedent establishes the perimeters of tutela 
relief. Furthermore, other jurisdictions have been known to allow 
constitutional challenges to the enforcement of arbitral awards, suggesting 
that Colombia’s acción de tutela only appears striking in contrast to U.S. 
law, which does not tend to discuss arbitration in constitutional terms.396 
Given the proactive nature of the Colombian legislature, questions 
have been raised as to whether Colombia is on the brink of adopting the 
Model Arbitration Law.397 While such a move would be as useful in 
Colombia as it would be in the United States,398 the primary benefit of such 
a reform would be procedural, in that it would help unify the patchwork of 
legislation that is currently in place.399 The substantive benefits are not 
quite as clear, since Colombia’s arbitral regime is already highly consistent 
 
 394.  See Carter, Improving Recognition, supra note 28 (including informal translation of draft 
articles on recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards). Notably, a decision on exequatur is already 
non-appealable, although those decisions may be subject to a motion for revision or an acción de tutela. 
See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 38, para. 10; see supra note 384 and 
accompanying text (noting an acción de tutela is only available after other remedies have been 
exhausted). 
 395.  See Zuleta, Colombia, supra note 28, para. 50. 
 396.  See PETER B. RUTLEDGE, ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (forthcoming 2011); S.I. 
Strong, Enforcing Class Arbitration in the International Sphere: Due Process and Public Policy 
Concerns, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 32, 59-60, 73, 95 (2008) (discussing constitutional issues in Spain 
and Germany). 
 397.  See Morales, supra note 28, at 167 (suggesting this is the case). 
 398.  Calls have been made to reform or amend the FAA to correspond more closely with the 
principles outlined in the Model Arbitration Law. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2006); Model Arbitration 
Law, supra note 22; William W. Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration: The Case for FAA 
Reform, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1241, 1243 (2003). 
 399.  See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text. 
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with international norms. Although there are some practices and procedures 
that U.S. parties will find unfamiliar, there is little to cause alarm. 
In large part, this is due to the fact that Colombian law gives parties to 
an international arbitration a great deal of autonomy in how they structure 
their proceedings. As U.S. parties gain a better understanding of the 
Colombian arbitral regime, they will be in a better position to know what 
factors can and should be addressed in an arbitration agreement involving a 
Colombian party or a Colombian seat. As a result, U.S. commercial actors 
will be able to negotiate cross-border transactions with increased 
confidence that any arbitration that eventually arises will be adequate to 
their needs and expectations. 
This is not to say that an arbitration between a U.S. and Colombian 
party will be perfect in every possible way. However, transparency and full 
disclosure about risks and potential exposure is all that can ultimately be 
aspired to in law or in business. There is nothing that Colombia, or indeed 
any nation, can do to make arbitration entirely risk- or cost-free. Instead, 
the only reasonable goal is to make the process fair, consistent and 
relatively efficient. In that, Colombia has succeeded. 
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